

Question	Sub-indicator	4	3	2	1	0	Sub-Indicator Notes	
POLITICAL RISK								
If a corrupt individual or group is able to influence defence and security policy (for example, to create a requirement for procurement of fast jets when no such need truly exists), this is high-level corruption								
Defence and Security Policy and Policy Transparency								
A defence process can be manipulated or complicated in order to hide corrupt decisions and illicit enrichment, for example, if a policy approval procedure is lacking or policy decisions are not published. In the most extreme cases, defence corruption at the highest level might represent 'state capture', if an elite is able to shape state decisions across much wider policy areas.								
Q1. Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy?	1A	Formal rights	Parliament has formal powers (in law) to approve or veto laws on security, and to reject or amend defence policy. It also has the right to review budgets, major arms procurements and defence decisions.		Parliament has the right to employ formal mechanisms to conduct scrutiny over defence policy, but lacks some of the powers listed in score 4.		Parliament has no formal powers over defence laws or policy.	
	1B	Effectiveness	Parliament regularly approves or vetoes laws on security, exercises budgetary power, and reviews or approves major arms procurements and decisions. Parliament can also reject or amend defence policy.	Parliament performs all the functions of score 4, but not regularly. There are clear instances where parliament fails to effectively scrutinise defence policy, but these are occasional lapses.	Parliament debates or reviews defence policy and attempts to influence policy through formal mechanisms, but these attempts are limited.	Parliament debates or reviews defence policy, but fails to take advantage of its formal powers of oversight. It may exercise informal influence over policy in the case of no formal powers.	Parliament does not debate or review defence policy.	
	1C	Independent legislature scrutiny	Neither the executive nor the military coerce or unduly influence parliament to vote in their favour.	Either the executive branch or the military may occasionally coerce or unduly influence parliament to vote in its favour, or either may undermine parliamentary scrutiny of defence.	Either the executive branch or the military may regularly coerce or unduly influence parliament to vote in its favour, or either may regularly undermine parliamentary scrutiny of defence.		Both the military and the executive regularly undermine parliament scrutiny of defence policy.	
Q2. Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee	2A	Formal rights	There is a defence committee or similar institutions with extensive formal rights. The committee (or similar such organisation) has the power to scrutinise any aspect of performance of defence ministry or agencies, e.g., budgets, personnel management, policy planning, arms acquisition, and demand information on these areas. The committee is in a position to require expert witnesses to appear in front of it.		There is a defence committee or similar institutions with some formal mechanisms to conduct scrutiny over defence policy, but it lacks some of the powers listed in score 4.		There is no defence committee or similar institutions that is tasked with oversight and scrutiny of the defence sector OR the committee or institution exists but has no formal powers.	
	2B	Expertise	The committee is comprised of members with expertise in the defence sector who are able to influence decisions.		There are some committee members with expertise in the defence sector, but they are outnumbered or limited in their ability to influence decisions.		Most or all of its members have little expertise in the defence sector.	If no committee or institution exists, this sub-indicator should be marked <i>Not Applicable</i> .
	2C	Responsive policymaking	The committee reviews major defence policies and decisions every 5 years or earlier if new threats arise.				The committee fails to review major defence policies and decisions every 5 years or earlier if new threats arise.	If no committee or institution exists, this sub-indicator should be marked <i>Not Applicable</i> .

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Security Committee (or similar such organisations) to exercise oversight?	2D Short-term oversight	The committee meets at least once a month, and issues budget amendments and recommendations. It also requires ministries to consider, and respond to, recommendations within specific time frames.	The committee issues amendments to budgets and recommendations on a regular basis, but does not require ministries to respond, or allows indefinite time frames.	The committee issues amendments to budgets and recommendations on a regular basis, but fails in major instances to do so.	The committee occasionally issues amendments to budgets and recommendations, but not on a regular basis.	The committee does not exercise any short-term oversight over defence policy, or it is extremely limited in nature.	If no committee or institution exists, this sub-indicator should be marked <i>Not Applicable</i> .
	2E Long-term oversight	The committee conducts long-term investigations on current activities, including operations, or it can commission an external body to do it.		The committee conducts long-term investigations on current activities, or it can commission an external body to do it. However, operations are excluded from its scope.		Long-term investigations are not conducted or commissioned.	If no committee or institution exists, this sub-indicator should be marked <i>Not Applicable</i> .
	2F Institutional outcomes	Ministries regularly incorporate recommendations into practice.		Ministries sometimes incorporate recommendations into practice, but not regularly.		Ministries fail to incorporate recommendations into practice, or only incorporate minor changes.	If no committee or institution exists, or if the committee does not provide any recommendations, this sub-indicator should be marked <i>Not Applicable</i> .
Q3. Is the country's national defence policy or national security strategy debated and publicly available?	3A Scope of involvement	The defence policy or security strategy is debated by the executive, legislature, and the public. Public debate involves the media (interviews, op-eds, articles).	The defence policy or security strategy is debated by the executive, legislature, and the public. Public debate involves the media (interviews, op-eds, articles). However, debate is inconsistent and not sustained over time.	The defence policy or security strategy is debated by the executive, legislature, and the public, but not consistently. There is no in-depth dialogue with the media or civil society actors.	Individuals within the executive or legislature speak about the defence policy or security strategy, but there is little active debate or discussion.	The defence policy or security strategy has not been debated at all in the last year.	This indicator refers to public debate that falls outside of any formal consultation process. It is a reflection of the extent of public discussion and dialogue that arises between media, civil society, policymakers, and policy leadership, and may occur through a variety of venues: newspapers, television, radio, online platforms, journals, official statements, etc.
	3B Scope of debate	Discussion is in-depth and addresses all of the following issues: (1) clear articulation of the security threats that the country is facing, (2) procurement decisions (5 year plan) and level of defence spending, (3) link between threats and decisions on procurement, personnel, and budget, (4) use of defence capability (operations).		Discussion of the defence policy or security strategy focuses primarily on major threats (potential and existing), and level of defence spending.		Discussion of the defence policy or security strategy is superficial without discussion on key issues.	If there is no debate in a country, this sub-indicator should be marked <i>Not Applicable</i> .

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	3C	Public consultations	There are formal, regular public consultations on defence policy or the security strategy. The defence policy or the security strategy incorporate subsequent findings.	There are formal public consultations on defence policy or the security strategy. The defence policy or the security strategy incorporate subsequent findings. But these consultations are not advertised well or held regularly.	There are formal public consultations on defence policy or the security strategy. However, the defence policy or the security strategy fails to incorporate findings.	Consultations take place with public actors that are either very supportive of, or are explicitly funded by, the government.	There has been no formal consultation process involving the public in the last 5 years.	Consultation is an active process in which a government agency or department opens formal and informal communication channels between the organisation and its stakeholders. It is characterised by formal mechanisms for sharing opinions and inputs
	3D	Transparency	The public can easily access documents and regularly updated information on all aspects of the defence policy or security strategy. Documents are released at least four weeks before decisions are made to allow for public scrutiny.	The public can easily access documents and regularly updated information on all aspects of the defence policy or security strategy. However, documents are not released with adequate lead time before decisions are made.	While generally complete, information and documents are not available on all aspects of the defence policy or security strategy, and there may be significant delays in the timing of their release.	Information and documents on the defence policy or security strategy are available to the public only in part or abbreviated form.	Documents on the defence policy or security strategy are not released to the public at all.	Transparency of information occurs within and outside formal consultation processes.
Q4. Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption?	4A	Policy of openness	There is a policy that requires defence and security institutions to be open towards CSOs and the establishment of mechanisms to that end (e.g. consultation and sharing of information).		There is a policy that requires defence and security institutions to be open towards CSOs. However, there is no explicit mention of how to do that.		There is no formal or informal policy that requires openness towards CSOs in the defence sector.	
	4B	CSO protections	CSOs enjoy a range of protections (e.g. rights to freedom of expression or freedom of association) from government interference, and are able to operate openly and without intimidation from the government.	CSOs enjoy a range of protections from government interference, and are able to operate without intimidation from the government. However, they may not have complete access or freedoms in some sensitive areas.	CSOs enjoy a range of protections from government interference, and are able to operate within the country. However, they experience or fear potential reprisals by government.	CSOs are allowed to operate within the country, but the government uses manifestly restrictive laws to silence them or establishes burdensome registration and tax requirements.	There is very little or no space for civil society organisations to operate within the country. Independent CSOs may be accused of / charged with treason, espionage, subversion, foreign interference, or terrorism.	
	4C	Practice of openness	Defence and security institutions have specifically worked with CSOs on corruption issues on a regular and/or in depth basis. This includes not only civilian representative of government (head of internal audit, PR person), but also military representatives.	Defence and security institutions are open towards CSOs but have infrequently or superficially worked on issues of corruption. The military does not engage with CSOs on corruption issues.	Defence and security institutions are seeking (or are beginning to seek) CSO engagement from a range of CSOs, but not on corruption issues.	There has been some consideration of engaging CSOs and meetings may have taken place with the defence sector, but they tend to take place with CSOs that are either very supportive of, or are explicitly funded by, the government. OR CSO activity is extremely minimal in this area, and defence and security institutions rarely engage for this reason.	There is no engagement between the defence sector and CSOs, and/or requests by CSOs to work with the defence sector are denied	

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Q5. Has the country signed up to the following international anti-corruption instruments: UNCAC and the OECD Convention?	5A Signatory and Ratification status	The country is not a significant defence exporter, and it has signed up and ratified at least the UNCAC Convention. The country is a significant defence exporter, and it has signed up and ratified at least the OECD Convention.		The country has signed up to but not ratified all relevant instruments depending on its status as defence exporter.	The country is a significant defence exporter and has not signed the OECD Convention, but it has signed and ratified the UNCAC convention.	The country has not signed up to either instrument.	Note: If the country is not a significant defence exporter, the UNCAC Convention is the relevant document. If the country is a significant defence exporter, the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions is the relevant document. See page 2 here for a list of significant defence exporters: https://www.sipri.org/publications/2019/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-international-arms-transfers-2018
	5B Compliance	The country has complied with most of its obligations in priority areas covered by the relevant convention/s it has ratified.		The country has minor issues of compliance with one or both conventions it has ratified.	The country has major or significant issues of compliance with one or both conventions it has ratified.	The country has largely failed to comply with its obligations under ratified Conventions.	If the country has not ratified the relevant instrument, this sub-indicator should be marked <i>Not Applicable</i> .
Q6. Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate?	6A Public debate	Outside government, there is regular public debate among academics, journalists, opinion-formers, and CSOs about defence issues. Debate persists on high priority issues over a period of time, rather than being superficially addressed.	Outside government, there is occasional public debate among academics, journalists, opinion-formers, and CSOs about defence issues. However, when debate occurs, it addresses high priority issues with intensity and in-depth discussion.	Outside government, there is regular public debate among academics, journalists, opinion-formers, and CSOs about defence issues. However, debate often addresses issues superficially, rather than persisting through in-depth and regular discussion.	Outside government, there is occasional public debate among academics, journalists, opinion-formers, and CSOs about defence issues. Debate also addresses issues superficially, rather than persisting through in-depth and regular discussion.	Outside government, there is no or extremely limited public debate among academia, opinion-formers, and CSOs about defence issues.	
	6B Government engagement in public discourse	The government engages in regular debate with academia, opinion-formers, and CSOs about defence issues in collaborative ways. The government organises discussions with independent think tanks or civil society organisations, or through joint media briefings.	The government engages in regular discussion with the public about defence issues through open forums, an active website, or at media briefings.	The government engages in discussion with the public about defence issues through open forums, an active website, or at media briefings. However this does not happen regularly, or may exclude very important issues that the government chooses to avoid.	Where communication does occur, it is likely to be one-way: officials may provide some information but may not answer public questions.	There is no government engagement in public discourse about defence issues or official communications contain no meaningful information.	
Q7. Does the country have an openly stated and	7A Anti-corruption policy	There is an openly stated anti-corruption policy that applies to the defence sector.		There is an openly stated anti-corruption policy, but it is unclear if it applies to the defence sector or the government is in process of developing one that applies to the defence sector.		There is no anti-corruption policy, or there is one but it does not apply to the defence sector.	

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Openly stated and effectively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?	7B Effective implementation	The action plan at the ministry level reflects the institutional weaknesses in the system, and implementation has progressed according to the estimated timeline.	There is an action plan at the ministry level that reflects the institutional weaknesses in the system. While steps have been taken to implement the plan, it is either behind schedule, or implementation is not addressing the priority items in the action plan.	There is an action plan at the ministry level that reflects the institutional weaknesses in the system, but no actions have been taken to implement it.	There is an action plan at the ministry level but it is superficial, and does not address the institutional weaknesses in the system, OR there efforts to implement an action plan at the national level.	There is no action plan to implement the policy, nor have any actions been taken.	If a country does not have an anti-corruption policy that also applies to the defence sector, this sub-indicator should be marked <i>Not Applicable</i> .
Q8. Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?	8A Mandate and resources	There are identifiable compliance and ethics units within defence and security that are mandated to handle integrity and corruption in defence, and they are suitably staffed and funded.	There are identifiable compliance and ethics units within defence and security that are mandated to handle integrity and corruption in defence, but there are some weaknesses either in staffing and funding, or expertise.	Compliance and ethics units in the defence sector are in place. But there are extensive weaknesses in both staffing and funding, and expertise or their mandate is unclear.	There is no evidence of such units, but there is evidence that the country is making proactive efforts to establish them.	There are no compliance or ethics units in place and no effort to establish them.	<p>Note 1: These institutions could also be internal and/or external audit units, or anti-corruption agencies if their mandate extends to defence institutions.</p> <p>Note 2: Wherever the institutions are located, they need to have mandate to engage with defence institutions and actually use that mandate. So if there is a unit in another department, we'd be looking for evidence that they have a mandate to engage defence institutions and have exercised that mandate.</p>
	8B Independence	The institutions/ units are not in the chain of command of the defence and security institutions which they oversee. They report directly to a senior member of the Ministry of Defence (e.g. Chief of Staff).		The institutions/ units may be in the chain of command of the defence and security institutions that they oversee. However they can not be shut down by these institutions.		The institutions/ units are under political control or they are misused. The work of the institutions can be shut down by other defence and security institutions.	If a country does not have these institutions or units, this sub-indicator should be marked <i>Not Applicable</i> .
	8C Effectiveness	Staff within the units understand the corruption risks specific to their institutions. They are able to address risks independently and to ensure that other departments or units handle risks appropriately. Actions to handle risks may include training, oversight, or policy recommendations.	Staff within the units understand the corruption risks specific to their institutions, and are able to address some risks independently. But they are not able to ensure other departments address risks adequately.	Staff within the units understand the corruption risks specific to their institutions, but they are not able to address risks appropriately or adequately, either through their own work or by compelling others.	Staff within the units understand the corruption risks specific to their institutions, but they fail to prepare an effective action plan with appropriate mitigation measures which address the risks.	These institutions or units are not even aware of corruption risks within their institution.	If a country does not have these institutions or units, this sub-indicator should be marked <i>Not Applicable</i> .

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Q9. Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments?	9	The public view is that there is a clear commitment from the defence establishment that bribery and corruption are not acceptable and must be prosecuted, and that their efforts to tackle the problem are sincere and effective.	This indicator is not scored. Please discuss conditions in the country context related to good practice (Score 4).					
Q10. Are there regular assessments of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and are the findings used as inputs to the anti-corruption policy?	10A	Risk assessments	Corruption risks are clearly identified. Individual departments conduct their own risk assessments in a process that reflects "business-as usual," whereby corruption risk assessment is a regular practice.	Corruption risks are clearly identified, but risk assessments are conducted on the ministry or armed force as a whole, rather than with focus on individual departments.	There has been a partial assessment of corruption risks, but it does not clearly articulate risks for the ministry or armed forces.	There is some awareness regarding risk areas, but an official risk assessment has not been conducted for the ministry or armed force as a whole, or within individual departments. The government may have commissioned or taken part in ad hoc assessments done by external parties or agencies.	No defence-specific assessment of corruption risk has been commissioned or taken place in the last 2-3 years.	
	10B	Regularity	Risk assessments are conducted on an annual basis or more frequently.		There is a schedule for risk assessments, but they are conducted on a less-than-annual basis.		There is no regular schedule for risk assessments.	If risk assessments are not conducted, this sub-indicator should be marked <i>Not Applicable</i> .
	10C	Inputs to anti-corruption policy	Risk assessment findings are used to develop and regularly update the anti-corruption policy and institutional action plans.		Risk assessment findings may be used to develop an anti-corruption policy or action plan, but they are not used to regularly update either policy or practice.		Risk assessment findings are not used to inform anti-corruption policy or practice.	If risk assessments are not conducted, this sub-indicator should be marked <i>Not Applicable</i> .
Defence Budgets								
Transparency and openness in defence budgets, and effective auditing, help ensure that expenditure is subject to scrutiny and debate, which helps prevent wasteful, compromised, or illicit spending. It is important that the sources of income streams that make up the defence budget are identifiable, to ensure that these sources are legitimate and are not connected to corrupt activity.								
	11A	Acquisition planning process	There is a clear process for the entire acquisition planning cycle in place, with formally separate internal acquisition planning functions, e.g., budget, commercial, and finance. Connections between specific purchases and defence strategy requirements are made explicit.	There is a clear process for acquisition planning in place, but internal acquisition planning functions are not separated, e.g. budget, commercial, and finance. Connections between specific purchases and defence strategy requirements are made explicit.	There is a process for acquisition planning in place, internal acquisition functions are separated, e.g. budget, commercial, and finance. There are few, if any, explicit connections between specific purchases and defence strategy requirements.	The process for acquisition planning is in place but it is not clear, and internal functions are not separated. There are very few, if any, explicit connections made between specific purchases and defence strategy requirements.	There is no defined process for acquisition planning.	

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Q11. Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?	11B	Transparency	The public has access to information about the entire process itself so that information can be obtained as needed. Information that is proactively published includes justification of purchases, lines of responsibility, timelines, mechanisms, and outcomes.	The public has access to information about the process itself, but information may be delayed or not timely published.	The public has access to information about the process itself, but some items of information may be excluded from publication.	The public has limited access to information about the process itself, because a great deal of information is excluded from publication, or not provided upon request.	There is no transparency of the acquisition planning process.	
	11C	External oversight	There are strong external oversight functions that assess the country's long-term acquisition plans, their legitimacy and likelihood that plans are going to function properly. Parliament is also involved in oversight of acquisition planning.	These oversight functions assess performance, and the country's long-term acquisition plans, but they fail to assess the legitimacy of plans. Parliament is also involved in oversight of acquisition planning.	These oversight functions assess basic performance, but fail to assess long-term outcomes or the legitimacy of plans. Parliament is not involved in oversight of acquisition planning.	These oversight functions either simply review the figures or check that the internal audit have reviewed the figures.	There is no external oversight of the acquisition planning process.	
Q12. Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? And it is provided to the legislature in a timely fashion?	12A	Comprehensiveness	The defence budget contains comprehensive and disaggregated information on expenditure across functions. Information includes personnel (salaries, allowances), military R&D, training, construction, procurement/acquisitions, maintenance of equipment, disposal of assets, and administrative expenses (Ministry of Defence or other services).	The defence budget contains comprehensive information on expenditure across functions, but information on some functions listed in score 4 may be not be available in disaggregated form.	The defence budget may be completely missing areas listed in score 4, or information that is provided is highly aggregated or vague for most functions.	A topline figure is published for the defence budget, but it is not broken down into functions or areas.	There is no information available about the budget.	
	12B	Timeliness	The legislature receives an accurate defence budget proposal between 2-4 months before the start of the budget year.		The legislature receives an accurate defence budget proposal less than two months before the start of the budget year.		The legislature either receives no information, or it receives misleading or inaccurate information on proposed defence expenditures.	
Q13. Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way?	13A	Formal rights	There is a defence committee with extensive formal rights of scrutiny of the defence budget. The committee has the power to scrutinise any aspect of budget and expenditures. The committee is in a position to require expert witnesses to appear in front of it.		There is a defence committee with formal rights of scrutiny of the defence budget, but lacks some of the powers listed in score 4.		No such legislative committee exists, or it lacks any formal powers over the defence budget.	
	13B	Influence on decision-making	The committee has introduced amendments to the budget and there is evidence that in some instances these have resulted in changes to the budget. The committee engages in mid-year expenditure review and can strike out expenditures before they are incurred.	The committee performs all the functions of score 4, but this may not be in a timely fashion or there may be clear instances where the committee fails to scrutinise effectively aspects of the budget before the start of the fiscal year.	The committee reviews the defence budget and attempts to influence budgetary decisions through formal mechanisms, but these attempts are limited.	The committee reviews the defence budget, but fails to take advantage of its formal powers of scrutiny. It may exercise informal influence over the budget in the case of no formal powers.	The committee has no impact on defence budget decision-making.	If there is no committee or it lacks any formal powers, this sub-indicator should be marked <i>Not Applicable</i> .

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Q14. Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget?	14A	Proactive publication	The approved defence budget is proactively published for the public in disaggregated form. It is accompanied by an explanation of the budget intended for experts, as well as a concise summary with clear language for non-experts.		The approved defence budget is proactively published for the public in disaggregated form. They provide some budgetary explanation but it is superficial.	The approved defence budget is published for the public in aggregated form with limited or no budgetary explanation.	The approved defence budget is not made publicly available at all.	
	14B	Comprehensiveness	The vast majority of the approved defence budget is fully disclosed to the media and civil society actors. There may be exceptions made for legitimate sensitive areas, but there is clear and robust oversight of the full budget by other suitable authorities.		Most areas of the approved defence budget are not published in detail but there is still evidence of oversight by other suitable authorities. Certain areas of the budget are undisclosed but this is neither made clear nor publicly justified.		Most areas of the approved defence budget are not publicly available.	If there is no defence budget published at all, this sub-indicator should be marked <i>Not Applicable</i> .
	14C	Response to information requests	Information requested by citizens, media, and civil society about the defence budget is provided in a timely fashion, without systematic and unjustifiable delays. There are few instances where information is unduly refused or redacted for national security reasons.	Information requested by citizens, media, and civil society about the defence budget is provided, but there may be unjustifiable delays. There are few instances where information is unduly refused or redacted for national security reasons.	Information requested by citizens, media, and civil society about the defence budget is provided, but there may be occasional delays without obvious justification. There may also be a pattern of unduly refusing or redacting information for national security reasons.	There is a serious and systematic failure to release information. This may be in specific areas or accessibility to requested information may vary according to the identity of the individual or organisation requesting information.	It is extremely difficult or impossible to obtain any detail on the budget.	
Q15. Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?	15A	Transparency	There is full publication of all sources of income, the amounts received, and the allocation of this income.	There is full publication of all sources of income, the amounts received, but inadequate information on the allocation of income.	There is full publication of income sources, but there may be little or no release of information about amounts received or the allocation of this income, or there may be full publication but only of selected income sources.	There is only selective publication of income sources, and no information released on amounts received or the allocation of this income.	There is no publication of non-central government sources of funding, or the information that is published is considered unreliable.	
	15B	Institutional scrutiny	Mechanisms of scrutiny are in place and administered by a central government department, i.e., supreme audit institution, and the internal audit office within the defence ministry.	Mechanisms of scrutiny are in place and administered involving a central government department such as the supreme audit institution. However, the internal audit office within the defence ministry may either fail to scrutinise funding, or may not be allowed to release findings.	Mechanisms of scrutiny are in place and administered by the internal audit office within the defence ministry. However, the supreme audit institution does not conduct scrutiny of non-central government funding.	Any institutional scrutiny that is conducted on non-central government sources of funding suffers from political influence so as to be unreliable.	There is no institutional scrutiny of non-central government sources of funding.	
	15C	Public scrutiny	There is considerable and consistent scrutiny by the public, including media and CSOs.		There is some scrutiny by the public, including media and CSOs, but it may not be in-depth or consistent.		Public scrutiny of non-central government sources of funding is minimal or non-existent.	

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Q16. Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)?	16A	Activity	The internal audit unit engages in ongoing reviews of defence ministry expenditures and has the flexibility to build its own work programme for the year. Staff expertise is appropriate (e.g. there is low staff turnover rate). Its findings are valued by the defence minister.	The internal audit unit engages in ongoing reviews of defence ministry expenditures but may not have flexibility to build its own work programme for the year. Staff expertise is generally appropriate and findings are valued by the defence minister.	The internal audit unit engages in ongoing reviews of defence ministry expenditures but there are questions over effectiveness. Staff expertise may not be appropriate or its findings may not be valued by the defence minister.	The internal audit unit engages in irregular and superficial reviews of defence ministry expenditure. There may be regular deviation from formalised processes.	There is little to no internal audit of defence ministry expenditure.	
	16B	Enabling oversight	Oversight occurs for sensitive or critical issues. Enabling oversight bodies (e.g. parliamentary committees) are provided with non-redacted reports, which allow them to be effective in their oversight role.	Oversight occurs for sensitive or critical issues. Enabling oversight bodies (e.g. parliamentary committees) are provided with reports that may contain some gaps/redactions, or they are in summary form only.	There may be no oversight for sensitive or critical issues or enabling oversight bodies (e.g. parliamentary committees) are provided with reports that contain gaps/ redactions, or they are in summary form only.	There is no oversight for sensitive or critical issues and enabling oversight bodies (e.g. parliamentary committees) are provided with reports in summary form only.	There is no enabling oversight of the internal audit function of defence ministry expenditure, or there is no form of report provided to the oversight committee.	This refers to parliamentary oversight committees only. If there is no internal audit of defence ministry expenditure, this sub-indicator should be marked Not Applicable.
	16C	External scrutiny	Internal audit reports are proactively released to legitimate external audit bodies (e.g. anti-corruption organisations). The internal audit process is subject to regular and in depth reviews by external audit bodies.	Internal audit reports are proactively released to legitimate external audit bodies (e.g. anti-corruption organisation). The internal audit process is subject to in depth but not necessarily regular reviews by external auditors.	Internal audit reports are sometimes released to legitimate external audit bodies and the internal audit process is subject to sporadic or superficial reviews by external auditors.	Internal audit reports are rarely released to legitimate external audit bodies. When they are it is in summary form only, and the internal audit process is rarely subject to reviews by external auditors.	There is no external scrutiny of the internal audit function of defence ministry expenditure.	If there is no internal audit of defence ministry expenditure, this sub-indicator should be marked <i>Not Applicable</i> .
	16D	Institutional outcomes	The ministry regularly addresses audit findings in its practices.		The ministry sometimes addresses audit findings in its practices, but not regularly.		The ministry fails to address audit findings in its practices, or only incorporates minor changes.	If there is no internal audit of defence ministry expenditure, this sub-indicator should be marked <i>Not Applicable</i> .
Q17. Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence	17A	Activity	The external audit unit has the mandate to review the defence sector, and regularly audits military defence spending in a formal, in-depth process. Both financial audits and performance audits (value for money) of defence spending are conducted.	The external audit unit has the mandate to review the defence sector, and regularly audits military defence spending in a formal, in-depth process. Review consists of primarily financial audits, rather than performance audits.	The external audit unit has the mandate to review the defence sector, and audits military defence spending on a semi-regular, formal basis. Only financial and compliance audits are performed.	The external audit unit has the mandate to review the defence sector, but does not do so regularly or in much depth. There may be regular deviation from formalised processes.	There is little to no external audit of defence ministry expenditure.	
	17B	Independence	The external audit unit is independent of the executive. It has its own budget (e.g. passed by parliament rather than government), and there are legal protections in place for this budget not to be altered during the budget year.		The external audit unit is independent of the Defence Ministry but reports to the executive. It has its own budget (e.g. passed by parliament rather than government), and there are legal protections in place for this budget not to be altered during the budget year.		The scrutiny of the external audit unit is regularly undermined (e.g. by military and/or the executive) and this might be due to significant influence from the Defence Ministry or lack of control of its own budget.	If there is no external audit of defence ministry expenditure, this sub-indicator should be marked <i>Not Applicable</i> .

Question	Sub-indicator	4	3	2	1	0	Sub-Indicator Notes
expenditure?	17C Transparency	External audit information is published online proactively (in accordance with existing FOIA regulations), within a reasonable timeline and in detail (e.g. including analysis on audited accounts, oral briefings, expert advice, investigative work).		External audit reports are published online (e.g. reports on audited accounts, oral briefings, expert advice, investigative work), but with some redactions, in summary form, or only with a superficial treatment of the issue, and may not be made available within a reasonable timeline.		External audit reports are rarely published online and are not provided upon request.	If there is no external audit of defence ministry expenditure, this sub-indicator should be marked <i>Not Applicable</i> .
	17D Institutional outcomes	The ministry regularly addresses audit findings in its practices.		The ministry sometimes addresses audit findings in its practices, but not regularly.		The ministry fails to address audit findings in its practices, or only incorporates minor changes.	If there is no external audit of defence ministry expenditure, this sub-indicator should be marked <i>Not Applicable</i> .
Nexus of Defence and National Assets Where countries are rich in natural assets, such as oil, timber, minerals or fish, the military or security forces can become closely or improperly connected with their exploitation.							
Q18. Is there evidence that the country's defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?	18A Legal framework	Defence institutions are, by statutory or constitutional means, entirely prohibited from having controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation		Defence institutions are, by statutory or constitutional means, somewhat removed from having controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation		There are no restrictions on defence institutions or individuals having controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation	
	18B Defence institutions: Financial or controlling interests in practice	There are no cases of defence institutions being involved in businesses relating to the country's natural resource exploitation.	There may be instances of defence institutions involvement in businesses relating to the country's natural resource exploitation, but activity is regulated.	There may be instances of defence institutions involvement in businesses relating to the country's natural resource exploitation, but activity is unregulated.	Defence institutions involvement in businesses relating to the country's natural resource exploitation is widespread, but considered legal.	Defence institutions involvement in businesses relating to the country's natural resource exploitation is widespread and mostly illicit.	
	18C Individual defence personnel: Financial or controlling interests in practice	There are no cases of individual defence personnel being involved in businesses relating to the country's natural resource exploitation, OR there may be isolated cases, but activity is legal.	There may be isolated cases of individual defence personnel being involved in businesses relating to the country's natural resource exploitation, but activity is illicit.	Individual defence personnel involvement in businesses relating to the country's natural resource exploitation may be common in areas with major revenue streams. The government is actively seeking to tackle or regulate the issue.	Individual defence personnel involvement in businesses relating to the country's natural resource exploitation may be common in areas with major revenue streams.	Individual defence personnel involvement in businesses relating to the country's natural resource exploitation is widespread and mostly illicit.	
	18D Transparency	These interests are publicly declared, with details of sources of income, operations, and expenditures being transparent, fully disclosed, and with standards of governance equivalent to publicly owned commercial enterprises.		These interests are publicly declared, though details of their operations and expenditures are not transparent.		These interests are not publicly declared and are wholly non-transparent.	If there is no evidence that such interests exist, this sub-indicator should be marked <i>Not Applicable</i> .

Question		Sub-indicator	4	3	2	1	0	Sub-Indicator Notes
	18E	Scrutiny	These interests are subject to public and/ or parliamentary scrutiny that explicitly analyses the potential for impropriety.		These interests are subject to public and/ or parliamentary scrutiny that explicitly analyses the potential for impropriety, but the scrutiny is superficial in nature or rarely conducted.		These interests are subject to no form of scrutiny.	If there is no evidence that such interests exist, this sub-indicator should be marked <i>Not Applicable</i> .
Organised Crime Organised crime is present in every country and is a growing transactional security threat. Increasingly technology-enabled, it does not respect national or international boundaries. Motivated by the acquisition of wealth, it is arguably beyond the power of any one agency or nation to contain effectively, and may have penetrated defence, security, and intelligence establishments.								
Q19. Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?	19A	Penetration of organised crime	There is very low likelihood of military involvement in sectors in which organised crime operates.		There is moderate likelihood of penetration by organised crime into the defence and security sector.		There is a strong likelihood that organised crime has penetrated the sector, or there is confirmation that it has done so.	
	19B	Government response	The government is aware of the possibility of organised crime in the defence and security sector, and is taking action, or would be in a position to take action quickly should organised criminal activity take place. If there is a likelihood of organised criminal action taking place, the issue is included in the anti-corruption policy, and military leaders have publicly acknowledged the clear risk on this issue.		The government is aware of the possibility of organised crime in the defence and security sector, but its actions are unclear or inconsistent. This issue may be included in the anti-corruption policy, but only superficially. Military leaders fail to publicly address this specific issue.		The government is not actively trying to tackle the problem, or only gives it lip service.	
Q20. Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?	20A	Existence of policing function	There is a unit within the national police force that deals with organised crime and corruption in the defence services, or there is a unit within the military police with the same mandate.		There is a unit within the national police force that deals with organised crime and corruption, which may be authorised to work on issues in the defence sector.		No policing function is exercised over the defence services to investigate corruption or organised crime.	
	20B	Independence	These policing functions operate independently of the bodies that they investigate, and their budget is ring-fenced.		These policing functions are nominally independent, but in practice their work or budgets can be interfered with by top military officials or the executive.		These policing functions are subject to considerable and regular undue influence from top military officials or the executive.	If no policing function is exercised over the defence services to investigate corruption or organised crime, this sub-indicator should be marked <i>Not Applicable</i> .
	20C	Effectiveness	Cases are investigated or prosecuted through formal processes and without undue political influence.	Cases are investigated or prosecuted through formal processes, but undue political influence is attempted, and sometimes effective at derailing prosecutions.	Cases are investigated but not often prosecuted. There is clear undue influence in the decision making process, or it may be that only certain types of cases are prosecuted.	Cases are superficially investigated, or receive "show" hearings in which defendants are not punished.	There is a complete failure to investigate or prosecute, even in the face of clear evidence.	If no policing function is exercised over the defence services to investigate corruption or organised crime, this sub-indicator should be marked <i>Not Applicable</i> .

Question	Sub-indicator	4	3	2	1	0	Sub-Indicator Notes
Control of Intelligence Services Intelligence services gather information that has potential economic and political leverage. This makes them highly prone to corruption.							
Q21. Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective and independent oversight?	21A	Independence A parliamentary committee or independent body (e.g., appointed by PM) is designated to scrutinise the intelligence service's policies, administration, and budgets. It functions without undue influence from the executive or the military. Its mandate is matched by the body's powers and resources.		A parliamentary committee or independent body (e.g., appointed by PM) is designated to scrutinise the intelligence service's policies, administration, and budgets. It may occasionally be subject to undue influence from the executive or the military or its mandate is not always matched by the body's powers and resources.		There is no oversight or there is considerable and regular undue influence in the oversight of the intelligence service's policies, administration, and budgets. It is likely its mandate results in limited power and resources to carry out the oversight.	
	21B	Effectiveness The oversight function has access to classified information and meets at least every 2 months to review budget and expenditures, personnel issues, and policies of the intelligence services. Though meetings are held behind closed doors, a summary of findings is published.	The oversight function has access to classified information and meets at least every 6 months to review budget and expenditures, personnel issues, and policies of the intelligence services. Though meetings are held behind closed doors, a summary of findings is published.	The oversight function has access to classified information and meets at least every 6 months to review budget and expenditures, personnel issues, and policies of the intelligence services. Findings are rarely published.	The oversight function does not have regular access to classified information. It may meet less frequently than every 6 months.	The oversight function has little to no influence over the intelligence services.	If there is no independent oversight of the intelligence service's policies, administration, and budgets, this sub-indicator should be marked <i>Not Applicable</i> .
Q22. Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?	22A	Objective selection criteria Senior positions within the intelligence services are subject to objective selection criteria.		There is objective selection criteria, but it is unclear if it is applied.		The criteria for selection of senior positions are unclear.	
	22B	Selection bias There is no opportunity for intervention by third parties that may result in selection bias or undue influence in the selection of candidates.		Impartiality may be an issue, for example, because of links to the ruling party.		Senior positions in the intelligence services are primarily a gift of the executive.	
	22C	Vetting process There is full investigation of candidates' suitability through vetting by external party. This includes a hiring panel with security clearance, and the right to call witnesses and demand information.		Investigation of candidates' suitability is questionable, because elements of the vetting process are compromised or of low quality.		There is little or no investigation of individuals' suitability or prior conduct.	
Export Controls Arms export controls are susceptible to the risk of corruption as a vehicle for illegal arms transfers with negative consequences for international humanitarian law, human rights, and sustainable development. Arms deals tend to be surrounded by high levels of commercial and national security. This makes the trade particularly susceptible to the risk of corruption as a vehicle for illegal and undesirable arms transfers.							
	23A	Signatory and Ratification The country has both signed up to and ratified the ATT.		The country has signed up to the ATT, but not ratified it.		The country has neither signed up to nor ratified the ATT.	

Question		Sub-indicator	4	3	2	1	0	Sub-Indicator Notes
Q23. Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with Articles 7.1.iv, 11.5, and 15.6 of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?	23B	Compliance	The country has complied with each of three ATT articles.	The country has complied with just two of the articles.	The country has complied with only one of the articles.	The country has failed to comply with any of the articles, but it taking steps to do so.	The country has failed to comply with any of the articles, and is not taking any steps to do so.	<i>If the country has not ratified the ATT, or has only recently ratified it in the past six months, this indicator should be marked Not Applicable</i>
	23C	Parliamentary scrutiny	Upcoming arms exports are subject to robust parliamentary approval and debate.	Upcoming arms exports are subject to parliamentary approval and debate, but debate may be superficial or brief.	Upcoming arms exports are subject to parliamentary approval and debate, but approval is subject to undue political influence from the executive or military.	Upcoming arms exports are subject to parliamentary debate, but parliament has limited ability to influence decision-making.	Upcoming arms exports are not debated by parliament at all.	<i>If the country does not export any arms, this sub-indicator should be marked Not Applicable. Please verify this by checking the last three years of data with SIPRI (http://www.sipri.org/) or PRIO (http://www.prio.org/) databases.</i>
Lobbying in Defence								
Q76. Does the country regulate lobbying of defence institutions?	76A	Legal framework	The country has a robust framework for regulating lobbying activity: it ensures comprehensive coverage of the lobbying community through broad but clear definitions of lobbyists and their activities. Lobbying legislation applies to the defence sector.		The country has a framework for regulating lobbying activity: it ensures coverage of the lobbying community but it is not comprehensive and does not cover all types of activities. Lobbying legislation applies to the defence sector.		The country has no framework for regulating lobbying activity, or it has a framework that regulates lobbying but the defence sector is exempted.	comprehensive coverage and clear definitions, we assume that the legislation specifies: - Types of organisations and lobbyists covered - Form of contact e.g. phone, in-person, email. - Definition of lobbying e.g. re: policy, procurement decisions, public affairs generally. - Exemptions e.g. is there a minimum threshold under which certain organisations don't have to register, such as those with a
	76B	Disclosure: Public officials	Public officials in defence institutions are required to regularly publish and update records of lobbying meetings by specifying the details and frequency of interactions with lobbyists. They are also required to publish any conflicts of interest risks that have been identified and the mitigating actions taken.	Public officials in defence institutions are required to regularly publish and update records of lobbying meetings but are not required to specify the details or frequency of interactions with lobbyists. They are also required to publish any conflicts of interest risks that have been identified and the mitigating actions taken.	Public officials in defence institutions are required to regularly publish and update records of lobbying meetings but without specifying all the details or frequency of interactions with lobbyists. They are also not required to publish any conflicts of interest risks that have been identified.	Public officials in defence institutions are not required to publish or update records of lobbying meetings. They are required, however, to publish any conflicts of interest risks that have been identified.	Public officials in defence institutions are not required to publish records of lobbying meetings or to publish any conflicts of interest risks that have been identified.	If the country does not have legislation that regulates lobbying in the defence sector, this sub-indicator should be marked as Not Applicable. Note to researcher: Details of interactions with lobbyists include: - Names of lobbyist - Purpose of lobbying - Form of communication - Amount spent on activity (within bands) - The target of the lobbying

Question	Sub-indicator	4	3	2	1	0	Sub-Indicator Notes
	76C Lobbyist registration system	The country has a mandatory registration system that allows public disclosure of a lobbyist's identity, their clients, issue areas, targets, activities and financial information. Public officials may agree to meet a lobbyist only after checking whether the lobbyist has been entered in the register of lobbyists.	The country has a mandatory registration system but which allows public disclosure of fewer details of a lobbyist's identity and activity than required in score 4. Public officials may agree to meet a lobbyist only after checking whether the lobbyist has been entered in the register of lobbyists.	The country has a mandatory registration system but which allows public disclosure of fewer details of a lobbyist's identity and activity than required in score 4. Public officials do not have to confirm whether the lobbyist has been entered in the register of lobbyists before meeting them.	The country has a voluntary registration system. Public officials do not have to confirm whether the lobbyist has been entered in the register of lobbyists before meeting them.	The country has no registration system for lobbyists.	If the country does not have legislation that regulates lobbying in the defence sector, this sub-indicator should be marked as <i>Not Applicable</i> .
	76D Oversight & enforcement	There is a well-resourced oversight entity with a clear and strong mandate for oversight of lobbying. Sanctions for misconduct include criminal offences for serious breaches of policies and procedures and are regularly enforced.	There is a well-resourced oversight entity with a clear and strong mandate for oversight of lobbying. Sanctions for misconduct include criminal offences for serious breaches of policies and procedures but these are not always enforced.	There is an oversight entity, but it either has a weak or vague mandate or, is poorly resourced. Sanctions do not include criminal offences or are not always enforced.	There is a weak and poorly resourced oversight entity. Sanctions do not include criminal offences and are in any case rarely enforced.	There is no oversight or enforcement of lobbying legislation.	If the country does not have legislation that regulates lobbying in the defence sector, this sub-indicator should be marked as <i>Not Applicable</i> .
FINANCIAL RISK							
In the defence sector a culture of secrecy can create an environment in which good financial practices such as auditing by an external division are not employed on the grounds of national security. Yet much public trust is gained by being more transparent. In any organisation or department, sound management of assets, with timely and efficient accounting systems, is one of the most powerful devices for maintaining integrity. The better the systems in place, the less opportunity there will be for corruption. As well as providing opportunity for fraud, a poor and disconnected accounting system makes it easy to conceal irregularities. Even if irregularities are found, poor accounting makes it impossible to identify those responsible, and hold them to account.							
Asset Disposals							
Asset disposals are a common category for corrupt management. This can occur through the misappropriation or sale of property portfolios and surplus equipment. Even large assets can be poorly controlled and easy to sell off corruptly or undervalued.							
Q24. How effective are controls over the disposal of assets, and is information on these disposals, and the proceeds of their sale, transparent?	24A Controls	There is a clear policy or regulatory process, and there is an internal unit responsible for advising or overseeing the procedures, e.g., internal audit. There is a coordinating body within ministry that is responsible for aggregating disposal database reports.		There is a clear policy or regulatory process, but there is no internal unit responsible for advising or overseeing the procedures, e.g., internal audit.		There is no formalised, clear process for asset disposal.	
	24B Transparency of disposal process	Planned disposals are known in advance and are published publicly on the ministry's website, before a buyer has been identified. Comprehensive information is published, including specific details on the items that are being sold (location, timing, type of item, etc.)	Planned disposals are known in advance and are published publicly on the ministry's website, before a buyer has been identified. While information is usually comprehensive, there may be instances of incomplete or missing information.	Planned disposals may not be known in advance and are not regularly published publicly on the ministry's website.	Information on planned disposals may be missing key information or available in highly abbreviated form.	There is little to no information publicly available about the process of asset disposal.	

Question	Sub-indicator	4	3	2	1	0	Sub-Indicator Notes	
	24C	Transparency of financial results of disposals	The financial results of disposals are regularly publicly available and they are disaggregated.	The financial results of disposals are regularly publicly available and disaggregated but key information is often missing.	The financial results of disposals are regularly publicly available but in aggregate form OR They are disaggregated but irregularly available.	The financial results of disposals are not regularly publicly available and are released in aggregate form	There is little knowledge about the financial results of asset disposals.	If there is no evidence of asset disposal, this sub-indicator should be marked <i>Not Applicable</i> .
Q25. Is independent and transparent scrutiny of asset disposals conducted by defence establishments, and are the reports of such scrutiny publicly available?	25A	Scrutiny	Asset disposals are regularly scrutinised by an audit body, either the Supreme Audit Institution or Parliament. Scrutiny is thorough and formalised.	Asset disposals are scrutinised by an audit body, either the Supreme Audit Institution or Parliament, but these instances are irregular in nature. However, scrutiny is thorough and formalised.	Asset disposals are regularly scrutinised by an audit body, but scrutiny is superficial in nature.	Asset disposals are scrutinised by an audit body, but scrutiny is irregular and superficial in nature.	Asset disposals are not scrutinised by an oversight body of any form.	The audit body must be external to the defence institutions.
	25B	Independence	Neither the executive nor the military unduly influence scrutiny by the audit body regarding asset disposals.		Either the executive branch or the military unduly influences scrutiny by the audit body regarding asset disposals.		Both the military and the executive regularly undermine scrutiny by the audit body regarding asset disposals.	If asset disposals are not scrutinised by an oversight body of any form, this sub-indicator should be marked <i>Not Applicable</i> .
	25C	Transparency	Comprehensive audit reports are available to the public within a reasonable time frame.	Comprehensive audit reports are available to the public, but there may be significant delays in release of information.	Audit reports are released within a reasonable time frame, but only summary information on asset disposals is made publicly available.	Audit reports are released with significant delays, and only summary information on asset disposals is made publicly available.	Audit reports on asset disposals are not made available to the public.	If asset disposals are not scrutinised by an oversight body of any form, this sub-indicator should be marked <i>Not Applicable</i> .
Secret Budgets								
<p>Secret defence and security budgets are a perennially difficult issue, but these are open to abuse. A broader risk is when there are budgets outside defence that are also used by the military or security forces, but are not identified as defence or security budgets. A crucial ingredient in the creation of accountable armed forces and defence and security establishments is an effective and transparent process of allocating, managing, and overseeing their resources. Secret budgets here are defined as the budgets allocated to intelligence agencies and national security.</p>								
Q26. What percentage of defence and security expenditure in the budget year is dedicated to spending on secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services?	26		One per cent or less of expenditure is dedicated to secret items.	Three per cent or less, but more than one per cent, of expenditure is dedicated to secret items.	Eight per cent or less, but more than three per cent, of expenditure is dedicated to secret items.	More than eight per cent of expenditure is dedicated to secret items.	The percentage is not available to the public, or the information that is published is considered unreliable.	<p><i>Note:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Check first whether the overall budgets of the intelligence and security agencies is available. If it isn't or cannot be estimated from existing documents, then the score should be 0. If the overall budget can be estimated – for example, whatever is left in the material and administrative section after expenses on other issues of the security apparatus are accounted for, plus what is spend on procurement, etc., then base the score on the model answers. It might not be possible though as not all the information might be available to work out. - Where the agencies conduct

Question		Sub-indicator	4	3	2	1	0	Sub-Indicator Notes
Q27. Is the legislature (or the appropriate legislative committee or members of the legislature) given full information for the budget year on the spending of all secret items relating to national security and military intelligence?		27	The appropriate legislative committee or members of the legislature are provided with extensive information on all spending on secret items, which includes detailed, line item descriptions of all expenditures, and disaggregated data.	The legislature is generally provided with extensive information on spending on secret items, which includes detailed, line item descriptions of expenditures, and disaggregated data. However, there are some omissions of information.	The legislature is provided with information on spending on secret items, but description of expenditures is generalised into categories, or some data is presented in an aggregated manner.	The legislature is provided with very limited or abbreviated information on secret items, or expenditure on secret items is entirely aggregated.	The legislature is provided with no information on spending on secret items.	If there is no access to the actions of the committee, this sub-indicator should be marked as No Information Available.
Q28. Are audit reports of the annual accounts of the security sector (the military and intelligence services) subject to parliamentary debate?	28A	Comprehensive ness	Legislators are provided with detailed audit reports related to the security sector and other secret programmes. Audit reports examine all expenditures (major and minor).	Legislators are provided with audit reports on the security sector and secret items that exclude some details.	Legislators are provided with audit reports on the security sector and secret items that provide basic or highly abbreviated information.	Legislators are provided with audit reports on the security sector and secret items that provide basic or highly abbreviated information, and there are considerable omissions.	Legislators are not provided audit reports on the security sector and secret items, or secret programmes are not audited at all.	
	28B	Parliamentary scrutiny	Parliament or the appropriate committee regularly requires documentation or testimony from the military and/or intelligence services regarding the findings of the audit report. It also highlights any shortcomings in the audit process.	Parliament or the appropriate committee regularly requires documentation or testimony from the military and/or intelligence services regarding the findings of the audit report. However, it doesn't highlight any shortcomings in the audit process.	Parliament or the appropriate committee discusses the audit findings but does not request documentation or testimony from the military and/or intelligence services. It may not comment on the quality of the audit process.		Legislative/committee debate on the contents of audit reports may be limited or non-existent.	If legislators are not provided audit reports on secret items, or secret programmes are not audited at all, then this sub-indicator should be marked <i>Not Applicable</i> .

Question	Sub-indicator	4	3	2	1	0	Sub-Indicator Notes
<p>Q29. In law, are off-budget military expenditures permitted, and if so, are they exceptional occurrences that are well-controlled? In practice, are there any off-budget military expenditures? If so, does evidence suggest this involves illicit economic activity?</p>	29A	Permitted exceptions	Off-budget expenditures are not permitted by law		Off-budget expenditures are permitted by law, for some very limited exceptions (e.g. military involvement in natural disaster relief efforts may, for example, be one such type of military expenditure).	Off-budget military expenditures are permitted by law for general or broad exceptions.	Please note the difference between off-budget and extra-budgetary expenditure. Extra-budgetary and off-budget military spending can both compromise transparency and accountability. The first is spending on the military from other sections of the state budget. This may include e.g. the science or infrastructure budgets, special Presidential funds, or loans whose repayments come from the Ministry of Finance. Such spending is often not clearly disaggregated and reported, making it hard or impossible to disentangle all elements of military spending. Off-budget spending comes from outside the state budget altogether. This may include dedicated natural resource funds used for arms purchases, payments from the private sector for security, or military business activities. Off-budget finance may allow the military to conduct procurement without going through the Parliament or the Ministry of Defence, so that purchases are not assessed against strategic needs. Off-budget spending means that resources are allocated to the military outside of any general budget deliberations, and in many cases automatically.
	29B	Recording mechanisms	All off-budget expenditures are recorded in the respective budgets.		Only some off-budget expenditures are recorded in the budget. Or, all off-budget expenditures are recorded but in an incomplete or highly aggregated manner.	Off-budget military expenditures are not officially recorded in the budget.	If there are no off-budget expenditures, this indicator should be marked N/A
	29C	Prevalence	Off-budget military expenditures are rare.	Off-budget military expenditures happen occasionally, but this is not a widely practiced phenomenon.	Off-budget military expenditures happen occasionally, and either this is commonplace, or the extent to which this is a regular practice is unclear.	There are substantial off-budget military expenditures, but this involves legitimate economic activity.	There are substantial off-budget military expenditures and this involves illicit economic activity.

Question		Sub-indicator	4	3	2	1	0	Sub-Indicator Notes
Q30. Are mechanisms for accessing information from the defence sector effective?	30A	Legal framework	There is legislation and implementing guidelines that clearly stipulate: 1) how the public can access defence information; 2) what information is and is not available 3) how classified information is categorised 4) how the public can appeal those decisions 5) that there is an active, accessible, independent, external appeal or review body to review access to information decisions.		There is legislation and implementing guidelines that clearly stipulate access to information for the defence sector, but it may not contain all the elements listed in score 4.		There is no legislation or implementing guidelines that clearly stipulate access to information for the defence sector.	
	30B	Classification of information	The government operates a system of classification of information under a clear legal framework to ensure that information is adequately protected.	This indicator is not scored. Please discuss conditions in the country context related to good practice (Score 4).				
	30C	Effectiveness	The public is able to access information regularly, within a reasonable timeline, and in detail.		The public is able to access information, but there may be delays in access or key information missing.		The public is rarely able to access information from the defence sector, if at all.	
Military-owned Businesses In many countries, defence and security establishments maintain income sources separate to their state revenue streams. These include military-owned businesses, either civilian businesses or defence companies which are directly or indirectly owned by the defence establishment. These pose obvious corruption risks.								
Q31. Do national defence and security institutions have beneficial ownership of commercial businesses? If so, how transparent are details of the operations and finances of such businesses?	31A	Extent of commercial ventures	Defence and security institutions do not own commercial businesses of any significant scale. (Equivalent to 1% of the defence budget or less.)		Defence and security institutions have some ownership of commercial businesses, but totaling less than 10% of the defence budget.		Defence institutions have ownership (or are believed to have ownership) of commercial businesses that are major enterprises, or constitute more than 10% of the defence budget.	
	31B	Transparency	Any ownership of commercial businesses is publicly declared, with details of their operations and finances being transparent, fully disclosed, and with standards of governance equivalent to publicly owned commercial enterprises.	All or most ownership of commercial businesses is publicly declared. Either operations and finances are transparent, but not both.	These businesses are publicly declared, though details of their operations and finances are not transparent.	Only some businesses are publicly declared. Details of their operations and finances are not fully transparent.	These businesses are not publicly declared and are wholly non-transparent.	If national defence and security institutions do not have any beneficial ownership of commercial businesses, this sub-indicator should be marked Not Applicable.
Q32. Are military-owned businesses subject to transparent independent scrutiny at a recognised international standard?	32A	Independent scrutiny	There are no military-owned businesses, or where military-owned businesses exist they subject their financial statements to an independent external audit, based on relevant international auditing standards.		Military-owned businesses are subject to some scrutiny, but it is known that such processes lack independence or reliability.		Military-owned businesses are not subject to any scrutiny or auditing processes.	
	32B	Transparency	Full audit details are available to the public.		Though available to the public, audit details may be incomplete or abbreviated.		Audit details are not generally made available to the public.	If there are no military-owned businesses, this sub-indicator should be marked Not Applicable.

Question	Sub-indicator	4	3	2	1	0	Sub-Indicator Notes
Illegal Private Enterprise							
Misuse of assets extends to illegal private enterprises, with individuals gaining an income from state-owned assets. This may be through the payment of exorbitant fees to cronies for consultancy or other services, or the use of service personnel for private work. It can also include bankrolling of the military by private enterprises in return for military protection of their business interests. The development of a system of patronage between the military and private business is highly detrimental; the more profitable it becomes, the more difficult it is to counter.							
Q33. Is there evidence of unauthorised private enterprise by military or other defence ministry employees? If so, what is the government's reaction to such enterprise?	33A	Prohibition	The government strictly outlaws any unauthorised private enterprise, with appropriate sanctions in place to deal with offenders.		The government either does not explicitly outlaw private enterprises, or its sanctions are weak.		The government does not outlaw private enterprise under the umbrella of the state's defence and security operations.
	33B	Prevalence	Unauthorised private enterprise does not occur.	Unauthorised private enterprise is a problem with a few select individuals or institutions.	Unauthorised private enterprise is a common occurrence across individuals or institutions, but private enterprise is still mostly uncaptured.	Defence employees are engaged in unauthorised private enterprise to the extent that some industries are majority captured.	The government openly operates unauthorised private enterprises.
Actual Military Spending							
Q77. Is comprehensive data on actual spending on defence published during the budget year?	77A	Proactive publication	Details of actual spending on defence and security are proactively published in disaggregated form. They are accompanied by an explanation intended for experts, as well as concise summaries with clear language for non-experts.	Details of actual spending on defence and security are proactively published in disaggregated form. They are accompanied by an explanation but there may be some shortcomings, e.g. they may be overly broad or general in parts.	Details of actual spending are proactively published in disaggregated form. There is some explanation provided but it is superficial.	Figures for actual spending are proactively published but there is no explanation provided and/or spend is not disaggregated.	Reports on actual spending are not made available to the public at all.
	77B	Comprehensiveness	The vast majority of actual defence spending is fully disclosed. There may be exceptions made for legitimate sensitive areas, but there is clear and robust oversight of the full budget by other suitable authorities.	The vast majority of actual defence spending is fully disclosed. There may be exceptions made for legitimate sensitive areas. There is provision for oversight of the full budget by other suitable authorities but it is not clear how effective this oversight is.	Significant areas of spending are undisclosed, without there being clear justification for this. There is provision for oversight of the full budget by other suitable authorities but it may not be clear how effective this oversight is.	Significant areas of spending are undisclosed, without there being clear justification for this. There is no evidence of oversight of the full budget by other suitable authorities.	The vast majority of actual defence spend is not publicly available.
	77C	Timeliness	Details of actual spending are published within six months of the end of the financial year.		Details of actual spending are published within twelve months of the end of the financial year.		Details of actual spending are published more than twelve months after the end of the financial year.

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		77D Comparison against budget	Variances between the published budget and actual spend are detailed and explained.		Variances between the published budget and actual spend are explained but there may be some shortcomings, for example they may be explained only in broad and general terms.		Variances between the published budget and actual spend are not explained at all.	If no information on actual spend is publicly available, this sub-indicator should be marked as <i>Not Applicable</i> .
PERSONNEL RISK								
<p>Personnel can abuse their positions for personal gain or fall victim, directly or indirectly, to others' corruption. Personnel and recruitment processes are particularly susceptible to corruption, especially if it is endemic throughout a defence establishment. The most common effect of corruption in personnel is that it undermines the confidence of staff, making them increasingly prone to participating in or condoning corrupt practices. Staff with trust in the establishment they work for is key to the effective functioning of the armed forces and defence and security establishments.</p>								
Leadership Behaviour								
<p>For top officials and officers themselves, leadership behaviour requires committed and visible engagement by strong role models. They, in turn, need feedback through honest and objective assessment through, for example, third parties and opinion surveys. When leaders engage in corruption themselves, or knowingly permit it, the integrity of the organisations they lead is greatly compromised.</p>								
Q34. Do the Defence Ministry, Defence Minister, Chiefs of Defence, and Single Service Chiefs publicly commit, through, for example, speeches, media interviews, or political mandates, to anti-corruption and integrity measures?		34A Chiefs/Ministers : Internal communications	There is a clear commitment to anti-corruption and integrity measures by the Defence Ministry, as declared by the Defence Minister, the Chief of Defence, and Single Service Chiefs. Internal commitment is demonstrated through proactive anti-corruption measures, and regular communications about integrity from top level officers in service publications. There is a consistency of message, speaking to current violations and evidence that the integrity system is being implemented.	There is a clear commitment to anti-corruption and integrity measures by the Defence Ministry, as declared by the Defence Minister, the Chief of Defence, and Single Service Chiefs. Internal commitment is demonstrated through proactive anti-corruption measures, and occasional communications about integrity from top level officers in service publications. However, there may be some inconsistency in messaging among top officials	There is internal willingness to carry out processes, as demonstrated by internal strategic communications. However, internal messaging is sporadic and limited in nature regarding support of anti-corruption and integrity measures.	There is very little commitment by the Defence Minister, Chief of Defence, or Single Service Chiefs. Internal communications regarding anti-corruption measures are superficial and infrequent.	There are no internal communications about the commitment to integrity and anti-corruption by the Defence Minister, Chief of Defence, or Single Service Chiefs or the ministry as an institution.	
		34B Chiefs/Ministers : Public commitment	Public commitment is demonstrated through interviews with journalists and CSOs, and statements at events and conferences. Anti-corruption is part of public talking points for top level officers, with explicit reference to integrity and good defence governance, and management of corruption risks.	Commitment is publicly stated – though perhaps not strongly. Chiefs and Ministers may publicly speak about values or code of conduct, but fail to mention specific integrity measures and management of risk.	Communications staff make statements and issue publications about integrity and anti-corruption as apparently declared by top officials, but top officials do not address these issues at public events. Although the ministry might be going through a reform process and made integrity commitments, few top officials are speaking to the public about these measures.	Public commitment to anti-corruption and integrity measures consists of general communications statements of a superficial nature, with no reference BY Chiefs or Ministers.	There is no public commitment by the Defence Minister, Chief of Defence, or Single Service Chiefs or the ministry as an institution.	

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		34C Unit commanders and leaders	This commitment is reflected throughout the defence ministry and armed forces by similar statements from senior ministry staff and senior armed forces officers, at unit parades, graduation ceremonies, and in writing through service publications. There is explicit reference to integrity and good defence governance, and management of corruption risks.	This commitment is reflected throughout the defence ministry and armed forces by statements by senior ministry staff and senior armed forces officers about values and conduct. Locations include unit parades, graduation ceremonies, or in writing through service publications. However, officials fail to speak in depth about integrity measures or management of risk.	This commitment is reflected in service publications, through regular statements by senior ministry staff and senior armed forces officers about values and conduct. Officials do not address integrity measures or management of risk.	There is some commitment reflected in service publications, through statements about values and conduct by senior ministry staff and senior armed forces officers. But these statements happen only occasionally.	There are few (if any) statements of commitment by senior ministry of defence or armed forces staff.	
Q35. Are there effective measures in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption, and is there evidence that these measures are being carried out?		35A Sanctions	There are a range of clearly defined offences in law that clearly apply to the defence sector. These offences cover (at a minimum) offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting of any item of value to influence the actions of an official or other person in charge of a public or legal duty. Possible sanctions include criminal prosecution/ incarceration, dismissal, and considerable financial penalties.	Bribery and/or corruption are defined offences in law that clearly apply to the defence sector, but 2 or more of the following mechanisms are not provided for: offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting bribes. Possible sanctions include criminal prosecution/ incarceration, dismissal, and considerable financial penalties.	Bribery and/or corruption are defined offences in law that clearly apply to the defence sector, but 2 or more of the following mechanisms are not provided for: offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting bribes. Sanctions exist in law, but maximum penalties constitute less than 1 year imprisonment or weak fines that would not act as a deterrent.	Bribery and/or corruption are not defined offences in law that apply to the defence sector, but there are wider legal mechanisms in place (e.g. national laws supported by policies, regulations, or other laws) used to address this.	Offences are not defined, or there is no evidence of other formal mechanisms, or the military are exempt from law.	
		35B Enforcement	Instances of bribery or corruption are investigated or disciplined through formal processes and without undue political influence.	Instances of bribery or corruption are investigated or disciplined through formal processes, but undue political influence is attempted and sometimes effective at derailing prosecutions.	Instances of bribery or corruption are investigated but not often disciplined. There is clear undue influence in the decision making process.	Instances of bribery or corruption are superficially investigated or rarely disciplined.	There is a complete failure to investigate or discipline even in the face of clear evidence.	If there are no measures in place, this sub-indicator should be marked as <i>Not Applicable</i>
Q36. Is whistleblowing...		36A Legal provisions	Legislation on whistleblowing and reporting corruption exists and is applicable to military and official personnel. There is explicit reference to protection of whistleblowers, including: protection of identity, protection against retribution, reversed burden of proof regarding retaliation, waiver of liability for the whistleblower, no sanctions for misguided reporting, right of the whistleblower to refuse participation in wrongdoing.	Legislation on whistleblowing and reporting corruption exists and is applicable to military and official personnel. There is explicit reference to protection of whistleblowers, but only some of the protections listed in score 4 are established in law.	Legislation on whistleblowing and reporting corruption exists but may not be explicitly applicable to military and official personnel. There is explicit reference to protection of whistleblowers, but only some of the protections listed in score 4 are established in law.	Legislation on whistleblowing and reporting corruption exists but is weak on protections for whistleblowers. Explicit reference to protection of whistleblowers may be absent or few of the protections listed in score 4 are established in law.	No legislation applicable to military and official personnel exist to facilitate corruption reporting or protection of whistleblowing.	

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Q36. Whistleblowing encouraged by the government, and are whistle-blowers in military and defence ministries afforded adequate protection from reprisal for reporting evidence of corruption, in both law and practice?	36B Prioritisation	Whistleblowing is actively encouraged through training, information, and guidance on the reporting of corruption and protections for whistleblowers. There is a well-resourced independent unit that handles claims, and institution-wide campaigns about whistleblowing that covers personnel at all levels.	Whistleblowing is encouraged through training, information, and guidance on the reporting of corruption and protections for whistleblowers. However, internal campaigns to promote whistleblowing are sporadic and superficial. Even so, there is a well-resourced independent unit that handles claims.	Whistleblowing is encouraged through training, information, and guidance on the reporting of corruption and protections for whistleblowers. However, internal campaigns to promote whistleblowing are sporadic and superficial, and the unit intended to handle claims is either poorly-resourced or not independent, e.g., assigned to an existing department that reports to the defence minister.	Whistleblowing is weakly encouraged. Although guidance materials are available, training and internal campaigns to promote whistleblowing are sporadic and superficial. A unit may have been designated to handle claims but as of yet is not in place.	Whistleblowing is not encouraged by the government. There are very few (if any) guidance or information materials, and there is no training or information campaigns. There is no unit intended to handle claims.	
	36C Effectiveness	Officials and personnel are confident that adequate protections (and protection of identity) are provided for whistleblowers and individuals reporting corruption claims.		Officials and personnel may doubt that whistleblowers are adequately protected. There may be vague or unclear language used by top officials that casts doubt on the process. Although adequate protections are in place, there are some doubts about its effectiveness in action.		There is little trust among officials and personnel that they would be provided adequate protection if they reported corrupt activity.	
Q37. Is special attention paid to the selection, time in post, and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions, including officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management?	37A Coverage of sensitive (higher-risk) positions	Special attention is paid to personnel in sensitive positions, i.e., individuals with significant autonomy over personnel, resources, and the policies/plans that determine them. This includes decision-making power in procurement, recruitment, contracting, financial and commercial management.		Some attention is paid to personnel in sensitive positions, i.e., individuals with significant autonomy over personnel, resources, and the policies/plans that determine them. Only one or two areas may be targeted as high risk (e.g., procurement), leaving other areas without special focus.		There is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities than others.	
	37B Selection process	There are specific procedures in place which limits conflicts of interest for these sensitive positions. This includes revolving door limitations and stringent vetting. Standard appointment/recruitment processes are followed for particular technical competencies.		There are have specific but weak procedures in place which limits conflicts of interest for these sensitive positions. Alternatively, these position-specific procedures are stringent but not regularly followed. Regardless, standard appointment/recruitment processes are followed for particular technical competencies.		Significant discretion is employed in the recruitment and selection of personnel in sensitive positions. Open recruitment is not the standard operating procedure, and position-specific conflict of interest procedures are absent.	If there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption than others i.e. recognised as high-risk or sensitive, this sub-indicator is not applicable.

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	37C Oversight	There is internal oversight in the ministry of defence to scrutinise appointment and promotion decisions of personnel in sensitive positions. Higher risk and sensitive positions are also subject to external scrutiny.		There is internal oversight in the ministry of defence to scrutinise appointment and promotion decisions of personnel in sensitive positions. However, there is no external scrutiny of higher-risk sensitive positions.		There is no special scrutiny of personnel in sensitive positions.	If there is no recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption than others i.e. recognised as high-risk or sensitive, this sub-indicator is not applicable.
Payroll, Promotions, Appointments, Rewards There are numerous key areas of integrity spanning other aspects of personnel. Areas of particular concern include corruption involving skimming and misdirection of the payroll, favours in appointments, fees to avoid or gain selection in conscription, and misuse of reward and discipline processes. Rewarding those who can pay, giving positions or money to those who haven't earned it, and sabotaging others to preserve power are unethical practices that undermine defence and security establishments.							
Q38. Is the number of civilian and military personnel accurately known and publicly available?	38A Accuracy	The number of civilian and military personnel is updated on at least a quarterly basis. There are established processes for publishing and verifying statistics on the composition of the armed forces.	The number of civilian and military personnel is updated on at least a six-month basis. There are established processes for publishing and verifying statistics on the composition of the armed forces, but there may be occasional inaccuracies.	The number of civilian and military personnel is either annually or less frequently - the number published is generally considered to be reflective of reality, but there may be some systematic inaccuracies (e.g. some figures may be out of date)	The number of civilian and military personnel is updated less frequently than every year, and there is considerable uncertainty surrounding the accuracy of the numbers.	The number of civilian and military personnel is not accurately known or officially collected.	<i>It is expected that the MoD or Armed Forces will release official numbers. If official numbers are released by another ministry (e.g. Finance), this will score only a 1.</i>
	38B Transparency	Information on the number of civilian and military personnel is made available publicly by the Ministry of Defence, disaggregated by rank bracket.		Aggregated or summarised information on the number of civilian and military personnel is made available publicly by the Ministry of Defence.		Information on the number of civilian and military personnel are not made publicly available.	
	38C Ghost soldiers	The military has not been presented with the problem of ghost soldiers in the last five years.					Ghost soldiers have been an issue for the military in the past five years.
Q39. Are pay rates and allowances for civilian and military personnel openly published?	39A Pay rates	Pay rates for all civilian and military personnel are published in service publications, disaggregated by rank. Summarised information is made available to the general public, e.g., on the ministry website.	Pay rates for all civilian and military personnel are published in service publications, disaggregated by rank. But no information is made available to the general public.	Pay rates are published only for selected civilian and military personnel.	Pay rates are for civilian and military personnel are available only in a cursory, abbreviated, or unreliable way.	No information on pay rates is available.	
	39B Allowances	Allowances for all civilian and military personnel are openly published, including criteria for eligibility and calculation methods.		Allowances for all civilian and military personnel are published, but do not include criteria for eligibility and calculation methods.		No information on allowances is available publicly.	
	40A Timeliness	Personnel receive pay on time.	There are occasional instances of late payment, but these are corrected within a few days.	There are occasional instances of late payment of 1-3 months.	Payment is delivered up to 3 months late on a regular basis.	There are regular delays in payment of over 3 months.	

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Q40. Do personnel receive the correct pay on time, and is the system of payment well-established, routine, and published?	40B	Accuracy	Personnel receive the correct pay.	There are occasional instances of incorrect payment, but these are corrected within a few days or weeks.	Basic pay may occasionally be subject to discretionary adjustments.	Personnel are not guaranteed to receive the correct salary because of systematic problems with the payment system.	Basic pay is regularly subject to discretionary adjustments.	
	40C	Transparency	The payment and allowances system is openly published. It includes all of the following, at a minimum: - Pay brackets for all ranks, disaggregated by seniority. - Details on how individual pay is calculated, including time starting in post / away from post - A list of all permitted allowances and expenses, the entitlement criteria, and caps on entitlement - Separated administrative, unit and audit responsibilities		There are considerable shortcomings in the transparency of the payment system. Two or more of the following are not visible: - Pay brackets for all ranks, disaggregated by seniority. - Details on how individual pay is calculated, including time starting in post / away from post - A list of all permitted allowances and expenses, the entitlement criteria, and caps on entitlement - Separate responsibilities for administrative staff, the individual's unit/command chain, and internal audit		The payment system is not published.	<i>The payment system should differentiate between different types of staff e.g. unit vs. administrative staff vs. audit staff. This should avoid all staff being grouped together under the same bracket.</i>
Q41. Is there an established, independent, transparent, and objective appointment system for the selection of military personnel at middle and top management level?	41A	Formal process	The system for appointment of military personnel at middle and top management applies objective job descriptions and standardised assessment processes. Promotion boards are open and representatives from other branches of the armed forces are invited and regularly sit on the board. The civil service is involved for very high level ranks.	The system for appointment of military personnel at middle and top management applies objective job descriptions and standardised assessment processes, though there is little independent scrutiny being paid to the promotion of senior personnel, e.g., promotion boards may not have independent observers.	Appointments do not always apply objective job descriptions and standardised assessment processes, e.g., decisions may be unjustifiable based on objective criteria, or promotion boards may have members from within the chain of command. However, this is not a widespread or common practice.	There are formal processes in place, but they are regularly undermined by undue influence or inappropriate conduct in the promotion process. The civil service is not involved in the appointment process at all.	There is no established appointment system for military personnel.	
	41B	Scrutiny	Appointments are subject to external scrutiny for high profile positions, which includes both process audits and a sample of individual promotions. Parliament also scrutinises decisions for very high level appointments.	Appointments are subject to external scrutiny for high profile positions, but this is not a regular practice. Parliament also scrutinises decisions for very high level appointments.	Appointments are externally audited for high profile positions, but this process is not elaborate and may even be superficial. Parliament scrutinises decisions for very high level appointments.	Appointments are only superficially audited for high profile positions, and parliament has no involvement.	There is no external scrutiny of the appointments of military personnel at middle and top management.	
	41C	Transparency	Information on the appointment process is publicly available and includes the selection criteria for each rank.		Information on the appointment process is only partially available on websites or to the public and/or may be incomplete with regards to selection criteria.		Little to no information is released about the appointment process.	

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Q42. Are personnel promoted through an objective, meritocratic process? Such a process would include promotion boards outside of the command chain, strong formal appraisal processes, and independent oversight.	42A Formal process	Personnel promotions are conducted through formal appraisal processes and promotions boards for all personnel. Promotions to senior ranks are open to scrutiny by independent personnel that are outside the chain of command. Service members from separate branches sit on the boards as independent observers.	Personnel promotions are conducted through formal appraisal processes and promotions boards for all personnel, though there is little independent scrutiny being paid to the promotion of senior personnel, .e.g., promotion boards may not have independent observers.	Personnel promotions do not always follow formal appraisal processes, e.g., decisions may be unjustifiable based on objective criteria, or promotion boards may have members from within the chain of command. However, this is not a widespread or common practice.	There are formal processes in place, but they are regularly undermined by undue influence or inappropriate conduct in the promotion process.	There is no indication of any formal processes, boards or oversight of the promotions process. Undue influence and inappropriate conduct in the promotions process may be widespread.	
	42B Exceptions	If a force permits any other means of awarding rank, such as acting rank or battlefield promotion, there are regulations that clearly limit the possible circumstances and place specific requirements on further progression.		If a force permits any other means of awarding rank, there are regulations that limit the possible circumstances and place requirements on further progression, but these regulations are vague or unclearly stipulated.		If a force permits any other means of awarding rank, there are no regulations that limit the possible circumstances and place requirements on further progression or, if they exist, they are not applied in practice.	
	42C Comprehensive ness	The following information is publicly declared for all officers above OF-4: - Name, - rank, - new post - effective date Equivalent information is available on request for civil service counterparts.	The following information is publicly declared for all officers above OF-4: - Name, - rank, - new post - effective date However, equivalent information is NOT available on request for civil service counterparts.	Postings and promotions are published but they include only some of the details listed in score 4. This is regardless of whether equivalent information is available for civil service counterparts.		Little to no information is released about postings and promotion cycle.	
	42D Frequency	Details of postings and promotions are published regularly (at least annually) within the system, and in advance of their effective date.		Postings and promotions are published regularly, but less frequently than annually. Or postings for only some positions are published.		Postings and promotions are published either very rarely or not at all.	If no information is released about postings and promotion cycle, this indicator should be N/A.
Conscription and Recruitment Corruption to avoid conscription into the military was recognised as a problem as early as Napoleonic times. Individuals may pay bribes to avoid service, or to enter preferred postings.							
Q43. Where compulsory conscription occurs, is there a policy of not accepting bribes for avoiding conscription? Are	43A Policy	There is a policy and strict rules addressing bribery for avoiding compulsory conscription that clearly apply to all parties engaging in this. Bribery offences cover (at a minimum) offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting of any item of value to influence the actions of an official or other person in charge of a public or legal duty.		Bribery and/or corruption are defined offences in law, but 2 or more of the following mechanisms are not provided for: offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting bribes.		There are no known policies or rules against bribery for avoiding compulsory conscription.	<i>If compulsory conscription does not occur, mark this sub-indicator not applicable.</i> <i>There must be explicit prohibition of bribery to avoid conscription. Bribery laws that apply only to government employees do not suffice.</i>

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there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?	43B	Sanctions	Possible sanctions include criminal prosecution/incarceration, dismissal, and considerable financial penalties.		Sanctions exist in law, but maximum penalties constitute less than 1 year imprisonment or weak fines that would not act as a deterrent.		There are no sanctions for avoiding compulsory conscription through bribery.	<i>If compulsory conscription does not occur, mark this sub-indicator not applicable.</i>
	43C	Enforcement	Appropriate sanctions or punishments are applied when bribery occurs.		Sanctions are inconsistently applied in the event of bribery.		No sanctions are applied when bribery occurs.	<i>If compulsory conscription does not occur, mark this sub-indicator not applicable.</i>
Q44. Is there a policy of refusing bribes to gain preferred postings? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?	44A	Policy	There is a policy and strict rules relating to bribery for soliciting preferred postings. Bribery offences cover (at a minimum) offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting of any item of value to influence the actions of an official or other person in charge of a public or legal duty.		Bribery and/or corruption are defined offences in law, but 2 or more of the following mechanisms are not provided for: offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting bribes.		There are no known policies or rules against bribery for soliciting preferred postings.	<i>This indicator refers to the entire military, regardless of whether conscription occurs.</i> <i>Bribery laws that apply to government officials/employees are appropriate for this indicator.</i>
	44B	Sanctions	Possible sanctions include criminal prosecution/ incarceration, dismissal, and considerable financial penalties.		Sanctions exist in law, but maximum penalties constitute less than 1 year imprisonment or weak fines that would not act as a deterrent.		There are no sanctions for soliciting preferred postings through bribery.	
	44C	Enforcement	Appropriate sanctions or punishments are regularly applied when bribery occurs.		Sanctions are inconsistently applied in the event of bribery.		No sanctions are applied when bribery occurs.	<i>If no sanctions for soliciting preferred postings through bribery exist in law, or there are no cases of bribery, this sub-indicator should be marked Not Applicable .</i>
Salary Chain The salary chain is the long link from the national treasury right down to payment to the individual soldier. In many corrupt environments those funds are stolen or diverted en route, so that far less of the due amount finally reaches the soldier.								
Q45. Are chains of command separate from chains of payment?	45		Chains of command are strictly separated from chains of payment throughout the ministry and armed forces.		Chains of command are generally separated from chains of payment, though there are exceptions in certain areas.		Chains of command are not separated from chains of payment.	
Values and Standards Tackling corruption requires attention to the values and ethical behaviour of troops, officers and officials. Building a strong ethical culture of adherence to policies, rules, and guidelines minimises corruption risk. This is particularly relevant in defence and security establishments, which traditionally have a strong custom of compliance to written regulations.								

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Q46. Is there a Code of Conduct for all military personnel that includes, but is not limited to, guidance with respect to bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities? Is there evidence that breaches of the Code of Conduct are effectively addressed?	46A	Code of conduct	There is a code of conduct, as a simple, readily understandable guide, for all military personnel, which comprehensively explains bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities. It provides specific guidance on how to proceed in the face of these events.	There is a Code of Conduct for all civilian personnel, but it does not cover all aspects listed in source 4. It does provide specific guidance on how to proceed in the face of these events.	There is a Code of Conduct, however, its content is not comprehensive. For example, it addresses corruption issues but it is too vague. It does not provide specific guidance on how to proceed in the face of these events.	There is a Code of Conduct but it is largely unknown. Or, it is known but does not address corruption issues at all.	There is no code of conduct for all military personnel.	Note: Please make sure to answer the question in relation to an actual Code of Conduct (or equivalent), not general measures for personnel involved in bribery and corruption. Please specify whether the Code addresses bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation.
	46B	Transparency	The code of conduct is available to the public and effectively distributed to all military personnel.	The code of conduct is effectively distributed to all military personnel but is not made readily available to the public.	The code of conduct is distributed to military personnel on an ad hoc basis, and may or may not be available to the public.	The code of conduct exists but is not distributed to military personnel. It is not available to the public.	The code of conduct is not available to the public or military personnel.	If a country has no code of conduct, this sub-indicator should be marked <i>Not Applicable</i> .
	46C	Enforcement	Breaches of the code of conduct are regularly investigated, even if the oversight mechanism is confidential. Cases are pursued where there is evidence of criminal behavior.	Breaches of the code of conduct are regularly investigated, even if the oversight mechanism is confidential. However, cases may not always be pursued where there is evidence of criminal behavior.	Breaches of the code of conduct are only occasionally investigated.	Breaches of the code of conduct are rarely investigated.	The Code of Conduct lacks credibility and as a result is not used or enforced.	If a country has no code of conduct, or if it is impossible to assess its enforcement, this sub-indicator should be marked <i>Not Applicable</i> .
	46D	Training	Guidance on the code of conduct is included in induction training for all military personnel.		Guidance on the code of conduct is available to all military personnel, but is not part of induction training.	Ad hoc guidance may be provided to military personnel by commanding officers.	No guidance of any kind is provided to military personnel on the code of conduct.	If a country has no code of conduct, this sub-indicator should be marked <i>Not Applicable</i> .
Q47. Is there a Code of Conduct for all civilian personnel that includes, but is not limited to, guidance with respect to bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities? Is there evidence that breaches of the Code of Conduct are effectively addressed?	47A	Code of conduct	There is a code of conduct, as a simple, readily understandable guide, for all civilian personnel, which comprehensively explains bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities. It provides specific guidance on how to proceed in the face of these events.	There is a Code of Conduct for all civilian personnel, but it does not cover all aspects listed in source 4. It does provide specific guidance on how to proceed in the face of these events.	There is a Code of Conduct, however, its content is not comprehensive. For example, it addresses corruption issues but it is too vague. It does not provide specific guidance on how to proceed in the face of these events.	There is a Code of Conduct but it is largely unknown. Or, it is known but does not address corruption issues at all.	There is no code of conduct for all civilian personnel.	
	47B	Transparency	The code of conduct is available to the public and effectively distributed to all civilian personnel.	The code of conduct is effectively distributed to all civilian personnel but is not made readily available to the public.	The code of conduct is distributed to civilian personnel on an ad hoc basis, and may or may not be available to the public.	The code of conduct exists but is not distributed to civilian personnel. It is not available to the public.	The code of conduct is not available to the public or civilian personnel.	If a country has no code of conduct, this sub-indicator should be marked <i>Not Applicable</i> .
	47C	Enforcement	Breaches of the code of conduct are regularly investigated, even if the oversight mechanism is confidential. Cases are pursued where there is evidence of criminal behavior.	Breaches of the code of conduct are regularly investigated, even if the oversight mechanism is confidential. However, cases may not always be pursued where there is evidence of criminal behavior.	Breaches of the code of conduct are only occasionally investigated.	Breaches of the code of conduct are rarely investigated.	The Code of Conduct lacks credibility and as a result is not used or enforced.	If a country has no code of conduct, this sub-indicator should be marked <i>Not Applicable</i> .

Question	Sub-indicator	4	3	2	1	0	Sub-Indicator Notes
	47D Training	Guidance on the code of conduct is included in induction training for all civilian personnel.		Guidance on the code of conduct is available to all civilian personnel, but is not part of induction training.	Ad hoc guidance may be provided to civilian personnel by commanding officers.	No guidance of any kind is provided to civilian personnel on the code of conduct.	If a country has no code of conduct, this sub-indicator should be marked <i>Not Applicable</i> .
Q48. Does regular anti-corruption training take place for military and civilian personnel?	48A Comprehensive ness	Anti-corruption training addresses the connection between corruption and the following topics: organisational values and standards, impact of the organisation, military effectiveness; identification and reporting of corruption, and risk management.	Anti-corruption training addresses the connection between corruption and some but not all the following topics: organisational values and standards, impact of the organisation, military effectiveness; identification and reporting of corruption, and risk management.	Anti-corruption training only addresses organisational values and standards, and identification and reporting of corruption.	Anti-corruption training is superficial in nature and does not address more than values or standards.	No anti-corruption training takes place.	
	48B Regularity	Anti-corruption training is delivered upon induction, once a year and upon entry to high risk positions and environments, and once a year for high risk personnel. It is also woven into promotion courses at all levels.	Anti-corruption training is delivered once a year, and upon entry into high risk positions and environments.	Anti-corruption training is delivered once at induction and upon entry into high risk positions and environments.	Anti-corruption training is conducted irregularly for entry into high risk positions and environments. No training is provided at induction or at regular intervals.	Anti-corruption training is done completely ad hoc, and may be only provided by donors or external parties.	If a country has no anti-corruption training, this sub-indicator should be marked <i>Not Applicable</i> .
	48C Coverage of personnel	Anti-corruption training is delivered to personnel at each rank bracket of the military and the equivalent for civilian personnel.	Training is delivered to higher rank brackets of military personnel and the equivalent for civilian personnel.	Training is only delivered to selected personnel in high-risk positions.	Training is integrated as a small portion of other compliance training modules.	Coverage of anti-corruption training is discretionary or sporadic, included in "moral" training or social conversations among officers.	If a country has no anti-corruption training, this sub-indicator should be marked <i>Not Applicable</i> .
Q49. Is there a policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities, and is there evidence of effective prosecutions in recent years?	49A Policy	There is a formal policy of the defence institution to make outcomes of prosecution publicly available.		There is an informal policy of the defence institution to make outcomes of prosecution publicly available.		There is no policy of the defence institution to make outcomes of prosecution publicly available.	
	49B Transparency	Both the charges and results of prosecutions are made publicly available. For court martials above a certain rank, information is released to public as matter of course. This includes the date, location and details of the charge, and information on the hearing.		The results of prosecution are made publicly available, but there is little or no access to information on the charges or the hearing, or other key details.	Information on prosecutions is rarely or inconsistently made available, without much detail.	No information on prosecutions is made publicly available.	
	49C Effectiveness	Cases are investigated or prosecuted through formal processes and without undue political influence.	Cases are investigated or prosecuted through formal processes, but there may be cases where undue political influence is attempted, and occasional cases where it is effective at derailing prosecutions.	Cases are investigated but not often prosecuted. There is clear undue influence in the decision making process.		There is a complete failure to investigate or prosecute, even in the face of clear evidence. Or, cases are superficially investigated, or receive "show" hearings in which defendants are not punished.	

Question	Sub-indicator	4	3	2	1	0	Sub-Indicator Notes	
Small Bribes and Favours								
Many citizens' experience of corruption is likely to be in the payment of small bribes in daily life. These might include payments for speeding up administrative procedures, bribes at checkpoints or payments to avoid predatory police. Policymakers who put in place a plan that focuses only on high-value corruption are unlikely to succeed; the general public needs to see benefit at a local level.								
Q50. Are there effective measures in place to discourage facilitation payments (which are illegal in almost all countries)?	50A	Legal framework	Facilitation payments are strictly and clearly illegal.		There law is insufficiently clear on the issue of facilitation payments.		Facilitation payments are not criminalised.	
	50B	Enforcement	Cases are investigated or prosecuted through formal processes. There is little substantive concern expressed from independent commentators over undue political influence.		Cases may be investigated but are not often successfully prosecuted. There is credible evidence to indicate undue influence in the decision making process.		There are clear failures to investigate or prosecute cases, even in the face of strong evidence. Specific concerns may be expressed by a range of independent commentators.	If facilitation payments are not criminalised, this sub-indicator should be marked <i>Not Applicable</i> .
	50C	Prevalence	Facilitation payments in the defence and security sector are very rare.		Facilitation payments occasionally occur in the defence and security sector, but are not widespread.	Rather than facilitation payments, there is extensive patronage in the defence and security sector.	Facilitation payments in the defence and security sector are widespread.	
OPERATIONAL RISK								
Military operations are complex—with a wide array of actors, a constantly changing environment, and often serious consequences. Their complexity means that they are rife with opportunities for corruption. The military's image during operations at home and abroad is vital in promoting and retaining public confidence and respect. Operations are the context in which the general population has most face-to-face daily conduct with the military and officials. Therefore their conduct is of paramount importance.								
Disregard of Corruption in-Country								
When international forces intervene in a country in conflict, their approach to corruption once in theatre is critical to the success of their mission. Disregard of corruption in-country runs a high risk of being seen as complicit in it.								

Question		Sub-indicator	4	3	2	1	0	Sub-Indicator Notes
Q51. Do the armed forces have military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations?	51A	Military doctrine	The country has a comprehensive and detailed military doctrine addressing corruption issues for peace and conflict operations at strategic, operational and tactical levels. The doctrine recognises that international actors can contribute to increasing corruption risks and offers guidance on mitigating these risks. Issues addressed by the doctrine include support for political actors, contracting, interaction with local population, partnering with local forces, and security sector reform in operational contexts. The doctrine also details the practicalities of implementation.	The country has a comprehensive and detailed military doctrine addressing corruption issues for peace and conflict operations, including the recognition that deployments can exacerbate corruption risks. However, the doctrine may not address risks at all levels or may not provide detailed and practical guidance for implementation.	The country has a military doctrine addressing corruption issues for peace and conflict, which briefly addresses how to mitigate this challenge, but there is little emphasis on the practicalities of implementation.	Corruption has been identified within military strategic documents as an important issue for operations e.g. the national defence strategy or similar, but there is no explicit doctrine on corruption.	The country does not consider corruption a strategic issue for operations.	
	51B	Transparency	The doctrine is made publicly available.		Some aspects of the doctrine are made publicly available, but not all of them.		No aspect of the doctrine is made publicly available.	If the country has no military doctrine that considers corruption a strategic issue for operations, this sub-indicator should be marked <i>Not Applicable</i> .
Q52. Is there training in corruption issues for commanders at all levels in order to ensure that these commanders are clear on the corruption issues they may face during deployment?	52		There is comprehensive training in corruption issues that is required for commanders at all levels. Training is delivered as part of military education e.g., at military academies, and in pre-deployment training for specific missions.	There is comprehensive training in corruption issues that is required for commanders at all levels. However, training is delivered either only in pre-deployment training for specific missions or as part of military education.	There is comprehensive training in corruption issues that is required for commanders at some levels or in some units, but not all.	There is training in corruption issues that is required for commanders at some levels or in some units, but not all. The content of training only addresses a few known risks (e.g. procurement).	The country has no known training in corruption issues for commanders.	<i>Take into account:</i> 1) <i>Whether the government provides training / guidelines / monitoring before deploying their troops under the foreign country's command; and/or</i> 2) <i>Whether it is government who ensures that there is training to counter corruption risk, regardless of whether the government themselves or a foreign government or a multilateral/non-government organisation leads the training.</i>
Q53. Is corruption as a strategic issue	53A	Forward planning	Corruption as a strategic issue is taken into account in the forward planning of operations.		Corruption as a strategic issue is taken into account in the forward planning of very few operations.		Corruption issues are not taken into account at all in forward planning.	

Question	Sub-indicator	4	3	2	1	0	Sub-Indicator Notes
considered in the forward planning of operations? If so, is there evidence that commanders at all levels apply this knowledge in the field?	53B Application	Corruption is taken into account in planning for operations, and in execution of some actions during operations (e.g. procurement). Larger operations have independent evaluations conducted by an Inspector General or similar body.	Corruption is taken into account in planning for operations, and in execution of larger operations where the country has the biggest deployments.	Corruption is taken into account in planning for operations, but mitigation approaches are not implemented consistently during deployments.	Corruption is taken into account in planning for very few operations, and mitigation approaches are not implemented consistently during deployments.	Corruption issues are not taken into account in planning or execution, and are regularly mishandled by officers during deployment.	Note: If the country does not conduct significant operations, then consider exercises or support to peace operations (e.g. by UN, EU), civil relief efforts. If there is no involvement of the military in any operations, this can be marked N/A.
Corruption within Mission							
There are too many cases where intervention or peacekeeping forces are themselves a source of corrupt behaviour, and corruption within mission occurs. Corruption during operations is not a one-way street, and military missions must address the corruption risks in their ranks as well as those in the countries they operate in. In many countries the military is used to provide internal security, often in circumstances where the police are unable to operate.							
Q54. Are trained professionals regularly deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field (whether deployed on operations or peacekeeping missions)?	54A Corruption monitoring	Expert personnel capable of monitoring corruption are regularly deployed and report on the status of corruption within mission at least once every six months. Reports contain assessments of the most significant corruption risks, the manner in which corruption can affect the goals of the mission, and the effectiveness of mitigation measures being employed.	Expert personnel capable of monitoring corruption are regularly deployed and report on the status of corruption within mission at least once every year. Reports contain assessments of the most significant corruption risks, the manner in which corruption can influence the goals of the mission, and addresses mitigation measures being employed.	Expert personnel capable of monitoring corruption are regularly deployed and report on the status of corruption within mission at least once every year. However, reports fail to adequately assess corruption risks and mitigation measures being employed.	Corruption monitors are irregularly deployed. They may not have the right expertise for the task. They may produce weak reports or may not report at all.	The country deploys no trained personnel for corruption monitoring, or informally monitors corruption with non-expert personnel.	Note removed
	54B M&E policy	M&E guidance for the mission clearly specifies how to monitor corruption risks, and establishes the procedural basis for personnel to monitor corruption.		M&E guidance for the mission refers to monitoring corruption risks, but in a general manner. It may fail to establish the procedural basis for personnel to monitor corruption.		There is no M&E guidance for the mission on how to monitor corruption risks.	
	54C Transparency	Reports are made available to the public and the relevant oversight bodies such as the parliament. Any content that is withheld is legitimately justified.		Reports are made available to the public and relevant oversight bodies, at least in summary form. However, critical information is missing from the reports and this exclusion may not be justified.		Reports are not made available to the public or oversight bodies in any form.	If the country does not deploy any personnel for corruption monitoring, this sub-indicator should be marked Not Applicable.
Contracting							
In a conflict environment, the flow of money into a country represented by local contracting and logistics – whether aid money or military support – is an important part of helping to develop that country. With all the problems in a conflict situation, it is easy for corrupt contracts to be awarded, and for non-performance to be tolerated. If carried out effectively, local contracting holds the potential to be a vehicle for resuscitating the local economy. However, widespread international military contracting also runs the risk of increasing corruption.							

Question	Sub-indicator	4	3	2	1	0	Sub-Indicator Notes
Q55. Are there guidelines, and staff training, on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions?	55A Comprehensive ness	Guidelines exist specifically for operations (e.g. standard operating procedures at the level of contracting). The guidelines address the following risks in contracting in operations: asset disposals, local power brokers, contract delivery monitoring, security of equipment and personnel.		There are guidelines for addressing corruption risks in contracting, but they are incomplete or very general.		There are no relevant guidelines for corruption risks in contracting.	<i>Take into account:</i> 1) Whether the government provides training / guidelines / monitoring before deploying their troops under the foreign country's command; and/or 2) Whether it is government who ensures that there is training to counter corruption risk, regardless of whether the government themselves or a foreign government or a multilateral/non-government organisation leads the training.
	55B Training	Staff are specifically trained on the types of corruption risks in contracting that are prevalent during operations or peacekeeping missions. These risks include: asset disposals, local power brokers, contract delivery monitoring, security of equipment and personnel.		Staff are not specifically trained on the types of corruption risks in contracting that are prevalent during operations or peacekeeping missions, but they do receive general corruption training.		There is no training provided on corruption risks in procurement, or any general corruption risks.	<i>Take into account:</i> 1) Whether the government provides training / guidelines / monitoring before deploying their troops under the foreign country's command; and/or 2) Whether it is government who ensures that there is training to counter corruption risk, regardless of whether the government themselves or a foreign government or a multilateral/non-government organisation leads the training.

Private Security Companies

Private military contractors are a growing feature of military operations. These companies often operate without the ethical guidelines, accountability to the public, and oversight that govern most traditional armed forces—the risk of corruption is therefore high.

Question	Sub-indicator	4	3	2	1	0	Sub-Indicator Notes
Q56. Are private military contractors employed and if so, are they subject to a similar level of scrutiny as for the armed forces?	56A Policies	The use of private military contractors is forbidden by law or the law may allow them to be employed in extremely limited circumstances which do not expose them to risk of corruption. The legal standard applicable to PMCs does not vary widely from standards applied to state representatives in the same roles, and it criminalises corruption-related offences for PMCs.	This indicator is not scored. Please discuss conditions in the country context related to good practice (Score 4).				Note: A clear policy on use of PMCs should include a well-established procedure for selecting PMCs, criteria for dealing with PMCs which had been convicted of corruption, and provisions for contract language which enables the state to fire PMCs for offence, including those related to integrity. The policy should also address the ways in which PMCs' work will be contracted and overseen, specifying that the contracting states will have oversight over subcontractors and laying out the policy for increases in costs and monitoring of results. Check whether the state implements The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies.
	56B Scrutiny	Laws of the contracting state contain clear provisions for oversight of PMCs. Active scrutiny is conducted by the relevant oversight bodies such as the parliament.	This indicator is not scored. Please discuss conditions in the country context related to good practice (Score 4).				If the country has no policies or laws on the use of PMCs, this sub-indicator should be marked as Not Applicable.
	56C Enforcement	Policies and laws on the use of PMCs are rarely violated, and when they are, sanctions are regularly applied.	This indicator is not scored. Please discuss conditions in the country context related to good practice (Score 4).				If the country has no policies or laws on the use of PMCs, this sub-indicator should be marked as Not Applicable.

PROCUREMENT RISK

Procurement is often cited by defence officials as the area in which corruption is greatest in the sector, with vulnerabilities at every stage. It is also the one where there is the largest range of anti-corruption tools to address the problem.

Government Policy

Corruption risk will be particularly high where legislation exempts or ineffectively governs defence and security procurement, and where scrutiny is lacking. Government policy may be conducive to corruption where there exist privileged defence relations, questionable defence budgets, or external financing with improper payback terms.

Question	Sub-indicator	4	3	2	1	0	Sub-Indicator Notes
Q57. Does the country have legislation covering defence and security procurement with clauses specific to corruption risks, and are any items exempt from these laws?	57A Legal framework	The country has clear and comprehensive legislation that covers all defence and national security purchases with no exemptions.	This indicator is not scored. Please discuss conditions in the country context related to good practice (Score 4).				This doesn't need to be defence specific legislation but a procurement law that is applicable to the defence sector.
	57B Corruption risks	The legislation recognises the risks of corruption and makes clear and comprehensive provisions to mitigate these risks.		The legislation superficially recognises the risks of corruption or has vague provisions on how to mitigate these risks.		Legislation covering defence and security procurement does not make reference to corruption risks.	If there is no procurement legislation that covers the defence sector, this indicator should be scored 0.
	57C Effectiveness	The legislation on defence procurement is thoroughly implemented and followed for all defence procurement.		Defence purchases are generally procured in line with legislation. There are some exceptions to the processes laid out by law, but they are minor.		Procurement requirements outlined in legislation are regularly bypassed, or exceptions to the law are significant either in terms of number or scale.	If the country has no legislation regulating defence procurement this sub-indicator should be marked Not Applicable. A general procurement code is acceptable if it covers defence procurement.
Q58. Is the defence procurement cycle process, from assessment of needs, through contract implementation and sign-off, all the way to asset disposal, disclosed to the public?	58A Formal procedures	The entire defence procurement cycle, from: 1) assessment of needs; 2) contract implementation and sign-off, and 3) asset disposal, is fully formalised.		The defence procurement cycle, from 1) assessment of needs; 2) contract implementation and sign-off, and 3) asset disposal, is partially formalised.		The defence procurement cycle is not formalised at all.	<i>This indicator refers to whether there is a formal process for defence procurement that is laid out in policies or regulations.</i>
	58B Transparency	Detailed procedures for the entire defence procurement cycle are disclosed, with clear explanation and in disaggregated form. This includes assessment of needs, contract implementation and sign-off, asset disposal; process of awarding contracts, and mechanisms for contract implementation.	Some elements of the defence procurement cycle are disclosed with clear explanation and in disaggregated form; other elements, though openly disclosed, are only summarised or are otherwise less clear.	The defence procurement cycle is disclosed, with clear explanation and in disaggregated form. But some elements from the list in score 4 are completely absent.	The defence procurement cycle is disclosed only in a very abbreviated or general way.	The defence procurement cycle is not disclosed.	
	58C Implementation	There are detailed policies and procedures for each step of the implementation process of the procurement cycle and there is evidence that these are followed in practice.	There are detailed policies and procedures for each step of the implementation process of the procurement cycle, but there are some shortcomings with implementation.	There are policies and procedures for each step of the implementation process of the procurement cycle, but they lack detail and there are shortcomings with implementation.	There is a lack of detailed policies and procedures for each step of the procurement cycle and there is no evidence that they are used in practice.	There are no policies or procedures for the implementation process of the procurement cycle. Or, there is no evidence that they are used in practice	<i>This indicator refers to the implementation of any defence procurement, formalised or informal.</i>
	59A Independence	Procurement oversight mechanisms are independent, formalised processes. Parliament, the military, business, or politically well-connected individuals have no undue influence on their performance.	Procurement oversight mechanisms are independent, formalised processes. They may be subject to occasional undue influence from parliament, the military, business or politically well-connected individuals.	Procurement oversight mechanisms are formalised, but they may be subject to persistent undue influence, e.g. by parliament or the military.	Procurement oversight mechanisms are not formalised. Or they are formalised but are dominated by undue influence and are not independent due to widespread undue influence.	There are no procurement oversight mechanisms.	

Question		Sub-indicator	4	3	2	1	0	Sub-Indicator Notes
Q59. Are defence procurement oversight mechanisms in place and are these oversight mechanisms active and transparent?	59B	Effectiveness	Procurement oversight mechanisms are highly active in summoning witness and documents, demanding explanations, issuing recommendations or conclusions that are being followed or implemented, and they can exercise their ability to cancel projects.		Procurement oversight mechanisms are active but they do not consistently engage in all the activities listed in score 4.		Procurement oversight mechanisms are highly inactive, or not active at all.	If there are no defence procurement oversight mechanisms, this sub-indicator should be marked as <i>Not Applicable</i> .
	59C	Transparency	Comprehensive evidence of activity (e.g. reports, announcements in the press of the cancellation of procurement programmes, the release of financial information) is made available to the public by the relevant procurement oversight institutions (e.g. parliamentary committee, a national audit function or bureau of public procurement).	Evidence of activity is made public by the relevant procurement oversight institutions but content is limited to the justification or rejection of procurement.	Evidence of activity is occasionally made public by the relevant procurement oversight institutions but content is either completely aggregated or missing key information.	Evidence of activity is rarely made public by the relevant procurement oversight institutions and the content is missing key information.	Procurement oversight mechanisms are entirely non-transparent about their activities.	If there are no defence procurement oversight mechanisms, this sub-indicator should be marked as <i>Not Applicable</i> .
Q60. Are potential defence purchases made public?	60A	Policies	The Government publishes comprehensive forward planning for potential purchases which extends 10-15 years in advance, e.g. through a strategic defence review, white paper or similar.	Forward planning for potential purchases extends 10-15 years in advance, but it is rarely comprehensive.	Forward planning for potential purchases extends 5-9 years in advance, and it is rarely comprehensive.	Forward planning for potential purchases extends less than 5 years in advance. There is no strategic defence review or white paper.	There is no forward planning for potential purchases, or it is less than a year in advance. There is no strategic defence review or white paper.	
	60B	Notice of planned purchases	The government publishes the plans for defence purchases in detail for at least the next 4 years. The adequate and timely information (e.g. elements of the defence equipment plan, itemized budget proposals) is sufficient to enable prospective suppliers to prepare and seek further information, and enough for oversight agencies and civil society to debate the necessity of the proposed purchases (e.g. the average procurement duration, justification of exceptions, and specific overview records by type of bidding procedure).	The government publishes the plans for defence purchases in detail for 2 years in advance. The information published is extensive.	There may be some information on forward purchase plans for the next two years, but it is not extensive.	There may be some information on forward purchase plans, but it is only for a year or less, or it is lacking in so much detail so as to be incomplete.	There is no information made publicly available on forward purchase plans.	

Question	Sub-indicator	4	3	2	1	0	Sub-Indicator Notes
Q61. Are actual defence purchases made public?	61A Comprehensiveness	Defence purchases are made public in detail, with almost no exceptions. Very little data from the tender/contract is redacted for national security reasons. For both confidential and non-confidential purchases, there is disclosure of the tender and the contract award. For the contract, there is a description of the item purchased, the winning bidder, the beneficial owners, price paid, whole of lifecycle costs, cost of servicing, costs of parts, and delivery/completion date.	Defence purchases are made public with almost no exceptions. Most of the information listed in score 4 is released, but some information is in aggregate or abbreviated form.	Some defence purchases are not made public. Security or confidentiality is often given as a reason for such secrecy but this is partly, but not fully, justified.	Some defence purchases are not made public, and there is no security justification as to why this information is withheld.	Defence purchases are rarely (if ever) made public, even though an aggregate total spend may be disclosed.	Note: Exemptions for security restricted items is an acceptable reason, but only where it is clear that the bulk of defence purchases are disclosed and this restriction is therefore credible.
	61B Accessible data	Data is almost always released in an accessible format (e.g. excel file) which allows for useful comparisons (e.g. how many tenders a company has won).		Data is sometimes released in an accessible format.		Data is rarely, if ever, released in a accessible format.	
Capability Gap and Requirements Definition							
Who defines where there is a capability gap or need for procurement? Where requirements are backed by a solid, transparent strategy, and where openly published security classifications are applied to defence procurement, we may be more comfortable that corruption prompted by exaggerated and inaccurate 'requirements' will be averted.							
Q62. What procedures and standards are companies required to have – such as compliance programmes and business conduct programmes – in order to be able to bid for work for the Ministry of Defence or armed forces?	62A Formal policies	There are laws and procedures detailing how the government discriminates in its selection of suppliers and sub-contractors on the basis of their integrity. For example, suppliers and sub-contractors are required to show that they have a formal and publicly declared anti-corruption programme in place that adheres to minimum standards established and specified by the procurement authority. The substance of the programme and standards are included in the main contract as well as subcontracts throughout the supply chain.	There are laws and procedures detailing how the government discriminates in its selection of suppliers and sub-contractors on the basis of their integrity. Companies may be required to show that they have a formal and publicly declared anti-corruption programme in place, but some minimum standards are not specified. These standards are included in the main contract as well as subcontracts throughout the supply chain.	There may be laws and procedures detailing how the government discriminates in its selection of suppliers and sub-contractors. Some anti-corruption standards are included in the main contract or subcontracts throughout the supply chain.	There are no laws or procedures detailing how the government discriminates in its selection of suppliers and sub-contractors, but periodically suppliers or sub-contractors may be required to sign anti-corruption clauses in contracts with the government.	There are no laws or procedures detailing how the government discriminates in its selection of suppliers and sub-contractors, and suppliers or sub-contractors are not required to sign anti-corruption clauses in contracts with the government.	
	62B Consistent implementation	There is evidence that these policies and laws are consistently implemented, including for strategically important suppliers.	There is evidence that these policies and laws are consistently implemented, but not always i.e. for strategically important suppliers.	There is evidence that these policies and laws are sometimes implemented.	There is evidence that these policies and laws are rarely implemented.	There is evidence that these policies and laws are not implemented.	If there are no such policies and laws, this sub-indicator should be marked <i>Not Applicable</i>

Question	Sub-indicator	4	3	2	1	0	Sub-Indicator Notes
<p>Q63. Are procurement requirements derived from a national defence and security strategy, and are procurement decisions well-audited? Are defence purchases based on clearly identified and quantified requirements?</p>	63A	Procurement requirements	Procurement requirements are derived from a national defence and security strategy, and there is logical flow down from strategy to individual procurement with no exceptions.	Procurement requirements are derived from a national defence and security strategy, but there may be occasions where procurements are not justified based on the national strategy.	Procurement requirements are in part derived from a national defence and security strategy. If the strategy is weak, vague or not sufficient to derive procurement requirements, work to quantify the need for significant purchases is occasionally conducted.	Procurement requirements are in theory formally derived from a national defence and security strategy. The strategy is likely to be weak, vague or insufficient to derive procurement requirements.	It is impossible to assess whether procurement requirements derive from a national defence and security strategy, even if a national strategy exists. There is no formal procedure in place for defining purchase requirements. Or the defence strategy may be secret so it is impossible to verify how procurement requirements are derived.
	63B	Scrutiny	There is active scrutiny conducted by a number of legally or constitutionally mandated oversight mechanisms (e.g. the parliamentary oversight committee, the inspector general, or the national audit office) to confirm that procurement is in line with national security strategy or that work is undertaken to quantify the need for purchases.		Scrutiny is occasionally conducted by a number of legally or constitutionally mandated oversight mechanisms (e.g. the parliamentary oversight committee, the inspector general, or the national audit office) to confirm that procurement is done in line with national security strategy or that work is undertaken to quantify the need for purchases.		There is no scrutiny of actual purchases.
	63C	Purchases	The Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces systematically base all purchases on clearly identified and quantified requirements.		The Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces base at least their major purchases on the clearly identified requirements, but there are opportunistic and unplanned purchases.		Purchases often are outside of the national strategy and appear to be opportunistic in nature.

Question	Sub-indicator	4	3	2	1	0	Sub-Indicator Notes	
Tender Solicitation, Assessment and Contract Award								
Corruption risk is increased where there is lack of open competition for procurement awards, where bidders are in any way favoured, and where assessment criteria are not objective or fair. Collusion between bidders poses a further risk.								
Q64. Is defence procurement generally conducted as open competition or is there a significant element of single-sourcing (that is, without competition)?	64A	Open competition	The vast majority (90%+) of defence procurements are conducted as an open competition, except in clearly defined and limited circumstances. There is a relatively small component (less than 10%) of single-sourcing.	The majority (70%+) of defence procurements are conducted as an open competition, though a significant minority of the value of contracts (10% to 30%) are single-sourced.	Most (50%+) defence procurements are conducted as an open competition, though a significant percentage of the value of contract (30% to 50%) are single-sourced.	Less than half (30-50%) of defence procurements are conducted as open competition. A majority of procurements are either restricted competition (i.e. 2-3 suppliers invited to compete) or single-sourced.	Very few (less than 30%) of defence procurements are conducted as open competition. A majority of procurements are either restricted competition (i.e. 2-3 suppliers invited to compete) or single-sourced.	Note: TI-DS defines 'single source procurement' as 'the noncompetitive purchase of goods or services that takes place after negotiating with only one supplier' (see here: http://ti-defence.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/140910-Single-Sourcing.pdf – also for some analysis of corruption risks around single sourcing). The key issue here is absence of competition, usually accompanied by absence of an open bidding process.
	64B	Scrutiny of single/restricted competition procedures	All single source and restricted competition procedure contracts must be justified and subject to external scrutiny (such as parliament or the external audit office), who have the power to reject the competition procedure selected.	All single/sole source and restricted competition procedure contracts are justified to external scrutiny who have powers to question the competition procedure selected.	Oversight agencies have powers to question the competition procedure selected and actively do so in a number of cases.	Oversight agencies have some powers to question single/sole/restricted competition procedure selected or purchase and occasionally do so.	Oversight agencies have no powers to question single/sole or restricted competition procedures.	
Q65. Are tender boards subject to regulations and codes of conduct and are their	65A	Conflicts of interest	Officials with a role in designing tender specification, or in tender board decisions, are subject to regulations or codes of conduct that are designed to prevent conflict of interest. Procurement officials are subject to restrictions on professional activity (e.g., shareholders of contracting firms, board member, advisor, or company officer of private firm, post-employment, etc.) and are required to file financial disclosure reports to demonstrate that neither the official nor his or her family have financial conflicts of interest in their work. Annual training is provided to procurement officials to avoid conflicts of interest.	Officials with a role in designing tender specification, or in tender board decisions, are subject to regulations or codes of conduct that are designed to prevent conflict of interest. Procurement officials are subject to restrictions on professional activity (e.g., shareholders of contracting firms, board member, advisor, or company officer of private firm, post-employment, etc.) but are not required to file financial disclosure reports. Annual training is provided to procurement officials to avoid conflicts of interest.	Officials with a role in designing tender specification, or in tender board decisions, are subject to regulations or codes of conduct that are designed to prevent conflict of interest. Procurement officials may be subject to some vague restrictions on professional activity. Training is provided to procurement officials to avoid conflicts of interest, but it is not regularly conducted.	Officials with a role in designing tender specification, or in tender board decisions, are subject to regulations or codes of conduct that are designed to prevent conflict of interest. Procurement officials may be subject to some vague restrictions on professional activity. No training is provided.	Officials with a role in designing tender specification, or in tender board decisions, are not subject to any regulations or codes of conduct to prevent conflict of interest.	

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decisions subject to independent audit to ensure due process and fairness?	65B Audit Trail	There is a comprehensive audit trail of which officials were involved in selecting suppliers and designing tender specification. There is also an audit trail of which officials (including politicians) are involved in tender award decisions.	There is an audit trail of which officials were involved in selecting suppliers and designing tender specification;but which is missing some information. There is also an audit trail of which officials (including politicians) are involved in tender award decisions.	There is some audit trail of which officials were involved in selecting suppliers and designing tender specification. There might not be an audit trail of which officials (including politicians) are involved in tender award decisions.	The tender board officials do not keep satisfactory records of the tender process and, therefore, it is difficult for oversight agencies to access a comprehensive audit trail.	There is no audit trail that oversight agencies can access, which details individuals involved in setting tender specifications, supplier selection and tender award.	<i>This indicator refers to the quality of evidence employed for external scrutiny of tender specifications and tender award decisions.</i>
	65C Transparency	Tender boards regulations and codes of conduct are fully transparent		Tender boards regulations and codes of conduct are only partially transparent.		There is no transparency of tender board procedures.	
	65D Scrutiny	There is robust external verification that the particular specifications of the tender are appropriate.		There is some external verification that the particular specifications of the tender are appropriate, but it is not comprehensive.		There is no external verification that the particular specifications of the tender are appropriate.	<i>This indicator refers to the strength of external verification of tender specifications.</i>
Q66. Does the country have legislation in place to discourage and punish collusion between bidders for defence and security contracts?	66A Legal framework	Laws are in place that prohibit collusion within the defence sector, where collusion is defined as between an official and a bidder or between bidders.		Laws are in place that prohibit collusion within the defence sector, but collusion is limited to bidders only.		There is no legislation covering defence procurement that addresses collusion.	
	66B Sanctions	There is clear legislation and implementing guidelines empowering procurement officials to exclude companies and senior company officials where there is a conviction or reasonable evidence of bribery & corruption related offences. An offence can result in prosecution, debarment from current and future competitions, or other sanctions, including heavy fines or imprisonment.	There is clear legislation and implementing guidelines empowering procurement officials to exclude companies and senior company officials where there is a conviction or reasonable evidence of bribery & corruption related offences. But the range of sanctions available is limited to debarment.	Procurement officials have limited authority to exclude companies and senior company officials where there is a conviction or reasonable evidence of bribery & corruption related offences. The range of sanctions available is likely to be limited (e.g. to debarment).	Procurement officials have limited authority to exclude companies and senior company officials where there is a conviction or reasonable evidence of bribery & corruption related offences. Available sanctions are vague or inadequate.	Procurement officials have no authority to exclude companies or individuals implicated in bribery or corruption related offences.	If there is no legislation that applies to the defence sector, this sub-indicator should be marked Not Applicable.
	66C Enforcement	Cases are investigated or prosecuted through formal processes and without third-party interference (e.g. undue political influence).	Cases are investigated or prosecuted through formal processes, but third-party interference (e.g. undue political influence) is attempted, and sometimes effective at derailing prosecutions.	Cases are investigated but not often prosecuted. There is clear interference (e.g. undue influence) in the decision making process.	Cases are superficially investigated, or receive "show" hearings in which defendants are not punished.	There is a complete failure to investigate or prosecute, even in the face of clear evidence.	If there is no legislation in place, or if there are no known cases of collusion, this sub-indicator should be marked Not Applicable.
	66D Training	Procurement officials are trained to identify collusion patterns and report potential malpractice.		Procurement officials are occasionally trained to identify collusion patterns and report potential malpractice. Or training is provided but it does not cover all the issues of collusion.		No training is provided to procurement officials with regards to collusion.	

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Contract Delivery and In-Service Support							
Where procurement staff are knowledgeable of suppliers' obligations in procurement contracts, and corrupt suppliers are appropriately punished, we can be more confident that procurement officials themselves are likely to be clean. This is enhanced where companies are given protection to complain about corrupt activity. It is also important that there is scrutiny of money flows during the in-service performance of equipment: corrupt exchanges may occur when payment is made for modifications and repairs.							
Q67. Are there mechanisms and procedures that ensure that contractors meet their obligations on reporting and delivery?	67A	Reporting policies & procedures	There are formal policies and procedures that outline how to monitor, assess and report upon a supplier's service and or delivery obligations. These include resolution or sanctioning procedures for incomplete or inadequate service delivery.		There are some formal policies and procedures but they do not address all the activities listed in score 4.		There are no formal policies or procedures that outline how to monitor, assess and report upon a supplier's service and or delivery obligations.
	67B	Transparency	All contracts are publicly available including modifications post award (such as change of sub-contractor, change of beneficial owner, additional costs, such as a consultant) are publicly available alongside the original contract award enabling scrutiny and oversight of changes. Oversight agencies receive information on and scrutinise quality of product and service delivery.	Contract modifications post award (such as change of sub-contractor, change of beneficial owner, additional costs, such as a consultant) are not always publicly available, and sometimes in redacted form, alongside the original contract award enabling scrutiny and oversight of changes. Oversight agencies receive some information that would enable them to scrutinise quality of product and service delivery.	Contract modifications post award are mostly publicly available but always in redacted format. Oversight agencies receive limited information that would enable them to scrutinise quality of product and service delivery.	Information is rarely released on contract failures and modifications post award. Oversight agencies receive limited information.	There is no transparency in the reporting and delivery obligations of contractors.
	67C	Monitoring	Officials regularly produce contract monitoring and completion reports. These include supplier and subcontractors performance appraisals, which is separately verified. If the contract was not sufficiently completed, action is taken for breach of contract.		Officials conduct some of the activities listed in score 4, but not on a regular basis.		Procurement offices are not conducting reporting and delivery obligations at all.
	67D	Enforcement	All breaches of contract are adequately acted upon. Issues are either dealt with internally, or raised with higher management in the ministry. If not resolved, issues are referred for further external scrutiny e.g. to the national audit office and defence committee.	Most breaches of contract are adequately acted upon. Issues are either dealt with internally, or raised with higher management in the ministry. If not resolved, issues are referred for further external scrutiny e.g. to the national audit office and defence committee.	Most breaches of contract are adequately acted upon. Issues are either dealt with internally, or raised with higher management in the ministry. However where issues are unresolved, they are not generally referred for further external scrutiny e.g. to the national audit office and defence committee.	Few breaches of contract are adequately acted upon.	It is not clear if breaches of contract are acted upon.

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Q68. Are there mechanisms in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement, and are companies protected from discrimination when they use these mechanisms?	68A	Complaints mechanisms	Formal mechanisms are in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement. This may include both a court process and an internal complaints mechanism.		In the case of no formal mechanisms, informal communication channels are used by companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement.		Companies have no opportunity to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement.	Complaints mechanisms may be specific to defence procurement or intended for all procurement processes.
	68B	Effectiveness and Accessibility	The complaints mechanisms available to companies are efficient and reasonably priced, and are regularly used.		The complaints mechanisms available to companies may be inefficient or expensive, but are occasionally used regardless.		The complaints mechanisms available to companies are costly and inefficient, and are thus rarely used.	If the country has no formal complaints mechanisms, this sub-indicator should be marked as Not Applicable.
	68C	Retaliation	For genuine (non-malicious) complaints, companies believe that they will not be discriminated against in future procurements.		Companies rarely complain because they believe that they will be discriminated in future procurement cycles.		Companies believe that if they complain they will be unfairly disadvantaged or debarred from future procurements.	If the country has no formal complaints mechanisms, this sub-indicator should be marked as Not Applicable.
Q69. What sanctions are used to punish the corrupt activities of a supplier?	69A	Sanctions	There is clear legislation and implementing guidelines empowering procurement officials to exclude companies and senior company officials where there is a conviction or credible evidence of bribery & corruption related offences.		Procurement officials have limited authority to exclude companies and senior company officials where there is a conviction or reasonable evidence of bribery & corruption related offences.		Procurement officials have no authority to exclude companies or individuals implicated in bribery or corruption related offences.	
	69B	Undue influence	Cases are investigated or prosecuted through formal processes and without undue political influence.	Cases are investigated or prosecuted through formal processes, but undue political influence is attempted, and sometimes effective at derailing prosecutions.	Cases are investigated but not often prosecuted. There is clear undue influence in the decision making process.	Cases are superficially investigated, or receive "show" hearings in which defendants are not punished.	There is a complete failure to investigate or prosecute, even in the face of clear evidence.	If procurement officials have no authority to exclude companies or individuals implicated in bribery or corruption related offences, this sub-indicator should be marked <i>Not Applicable</i> .
	69C	Application of sanctions	An offence can regularly result in a range of sanctions, including prosecution, exclusion from current and future competitions, or other sanctions, including heavy fines or imprisonment.	An offence can regularly result in softer sanctions (e.g. administrative fines), but not prosecution or exclusion.	Offences sometimes result in appropriate sanctions, but not on a regular basis.	Offences rarely result in sanctions.	It is not clear if offences result in sanctions.	If procurement officials have no authority to exclude companies or individuals implicated in bribery or corruption related offences, this sub-indicator should be marked <i>Not Applicable</i> .

Question	Sub-indicator	4	3	2	1	0	Sub-Indicator Notes	
Offset Contracts								
Offsets are arrangements when a government procuring goods or services makes the foreign supplying company reinvest a portion of the contract back into the importing country. Vulnerability to corruption arises from frequent lack of due diligence of potential improper beneficiaries, no monitoring of performance on offset contracts, no audits of what was delivered compared to pledges and no publication of offset results, benefits or performance. The complexity of offset contracts, where investment may span a variety of companies and subsidiaries, exacerbates the risk.								
Q70. When negotiating offset contracts, does the government specifically address corruption risk by imposing anti-corruption due diligence on contractors and third parties?	70A	Legal framework	The government prohibits offset contracts by law.		Offset contracts are permitted and regulated by legislation.		There is no law or policy that regulates offset contracts.	<i>Whether or not the government engages in offset contracts, they should be regulated. Countries must be scored.</i>
	70B	Due diligence	The government imposes stringent anti-corruption due diligence on contractors and third parties during offset contract negotiations		The government imposes some anti-corruption due diligence on contractors and third parties during offset contract negotiations, but they may be superficial in nature.		The government imposes no anti-corruption due diligence or auditing requirements on offset contracts.	This indicator should be marked Not Applicable only in cases where the government explicitly prohibits offset contracts.
Q71. How does the government monitor offset contracts?	71A	Policies & procedures	There are formal policies and procedures that outline the reporting and delivery obligations for offset contracts. This includes procedures for reporting on completed work, for addressing inadequate work, for sanctioning, and for following the chain of command.		There are some formal policies and procedures that outline the reporting and delivery obligations for offset contracts, but they do not address all the activities listed in score 4.		There are no formal policies or procedures that outline the reporting and delivery obligations for offset contracts.	This indicator should be marked Not Applicable only in cases where the government explicitly prohibits offset contracts.
	71B	Transparency	The government makes public a list of the contracts (including details of the investments and the supplying companies), details of the current performance of offset programmes, and copies of the contracts themselves. It also makes public the details of planned offsets contracts to enable public and civil society comment before contract award	The government makes public considerable detail of offset contracts and programmes, including a list of the contracts (including details of the investments and the supplying companies), and copies of the contracts themselves and substantive information of the current performance of the offset programme	The government makes public some details of offset contracts and programmes, including, at the least, a full list of the contracts, including details of the investments and the supplying companies	The government makes public only basic details of the offset programmes.	The government does not make any details about off-set contracts transparent.	This indicator should be marked Not Applicable only in cases where the government explicitly prohibits offset contracts.
	71C	Monitoring	Officials regularly produce a completion report with supplier performance appraisals, which is separately verified.	Officials occasionally produce a completion report with supplier performance appraisals, which is separately verified.	Officials occasionally produce a completion report with supplier performance appraisals, which may not be separately verified.	Officials rarely produce a completion report.	Procurement offices are not conducting reporting and delivery obligations at all.	This indicator should be marked Not Applicable only in cases where the government explicitly prohibits offset contracts.
	71D	Enforcement	If the contract is not sufficiently completed, action is always taken for breach of contract.	If the contract is not sufficiently completed, action is in most cases taken for breach of contract.	If the contract is not sufficiently completed, action is sometimes taken for breach of contract.	If the contract is not sufficiently completed, action is rarely taken for breach of contract.	Breaches of contract are not acted upon.	This indicator should be marked Not Applicable only in cases where the government explicitly prohibits offset contracts.

Question		Sub-indicator	4	3	2	1	0	Sub-Indicator Notes
Q72. What level of competition are offset contracts subject to?		72	Offset contracts are conducted as open competition, except in clearly defined circumstances. All single source contracts are justified and subject to external scrutiny (such as parliament or the external audit office), who have the power to reject the purchase.	Offset contracts are conducted as open competition, except in clearly defined circumstances. However, single source contracts are sometimes conducted without clear justification.	Offset contracts are generally conducted as open competition, but circumstances are not always clearly defined. Single source contracts are often conducted without clear justification.	There is little open competition in offset contracts, with most contracts being single-sourced.	Single source offset contracts are rarely (if ever) justified.	This indicator should be marked Not Applicable only in cases where the government explicitly prohibits offset contracts.
Agents / Brokers								
<p>Agents and brokers bring with them a variety of corruption risks. The use of undisclosed agents or middlemen is more widespread in defence than in any other industry. Whilst representatives have legitimate tasks in assisting companies to operate in unfamiliar cultures and styles of government, there is no doubt that the use of middlemen also facilitates the payment of bribes to decision makers. Nearly every case of defence sector bribery shows that an agent is the conduit through which bribes were paid. Arrangements involving agents and brokers tend to be secretive and they add an additional layer between the supplier and the supplied parties. Scrutiny of these intermediaries may be insufficient or lacking entirely.</p>								
Q73. How strongly does the government control the company's use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle?		73A	Policies	The use of agents and intermediaries is either prohibited by law or regulated by a strict and clear policy which requires as a minimum that anti-corruption clauses are included in contracts with agents, companies register agents and declare all forms of remuneration, agents receive payments into local accounts and company contracts outline the right to audit agent financial accounts by government agencies.	The use of agents and intermediaries is regulated by a strict and clear policy, but this policy does not include all the requirements laid out in score 4.	There are some controls over the use of agents and intermediaries, but no clear policy.	There are no controls over the use of agents and intermediaries, but the government has clearly indicated that it intends to rectify this issue.	The government imposes no restrictions on the use of agents and intermediaries, nor has it publicly committed to doing so.
		73B	Enforcement	Sanctions are usually applied when policies and laws on the use of agents are violated.		Sanctions are sometimes applied when policies and laws on the use of agents are violated.		Sanctions are not generally applied when policies and laws on the use of agents are violated.

Question	Sub-indicator	4	3	2	1	0	Sub-Indicator Notes
Financing Package							
Complex and secretive financing packages, where payment timelines, rates, and terms and conditions are poorly defined, pose a clear corruption risk. In many cases the main defence contract has a high level of scrutiny, but the same is very rarely true of the financing package.							
Q74. Are the principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals, (such as payment timelines, interest rates, commercial loans or export credit agreements) made publicly available prior to the signing of contracts?	74	Principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals are comprehensively detailed and made publicly available after the signing of the contracts. This information includes payment timelines, interest rates, commercial loans or export credit agreements.	Most details of the financing package are made publicly available prior to the signing of the contract, though some aspects of the package are less precisely detailed than other aspects.	Some details of the financing package are made publicly available, and key elements such as the sums involved and the payment deadlines are included. However details on matters such as interest rates and rules and regulations surrounding default penalties are likely to be limited.	The existence of a financing package and the identity of the provider are normally made public, but no further details are likely to be available.	Details of the financing package are not publicly available. There may be no information on whether a financing package exists at all.	
Seller Influence							
When procuring defence and security equipment and services, the interests of the armed forces should be the central issue. International political deals and arm-twisting can mean that the contract is awarded to a company because of its nationality, rather than its bid. To avoid corruption, it is important that the government bases procurement decisions on legitimate need, and is not pressured into purchases by sellers.							
Q75. How common is it for defence acquisition decisions to be based on political influence by selling nations?	75A	Prevalence: selling nations	Almost no acquisitions are granted as a result of political influence by selling nations.	This indicator is not scored. Please discuss conditions in the country context related to good practice (Score 4).			Please ensure that the scoring and comments focus on political influence by (other) selling countries in arms imports, not by the country being assessed. SIPRI can be a useful source when answering this question.
	75B	Justification	The government cites clear and justifiable military need for purchases and from particular supplier.	This indicator is not scored. Please discuss conditions in the country context related to good practice (Score 4).			
	75C	Prevalence: domestic pressures	Almost no acquisitions are granted as a result of domestic political pressures.	This indicator is not scored. Please discuss conditions in the country context related to good practice (Score 4).			By domestic political pressure, TI-DS means pressure that derives from the political elites of the country (e.g. parliamentarians, opposition politicians, politicised senior bureaucracy, etc.)